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In this essay a formal language will be constructed in which an essential part
of Thomas Aquinas’s ontology can be precisely formulated. In the formal
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language, an axiomatization of this part of his ontology will be presented,
and its exegetic adequacy shown by deducing a long series of theorems that
are in verbal accordance with the ontological teachings of Thomas. It will
be made plausible that no theorem contradicting his ontology can be derived.
The consistency of the axiom-system will be demonstrated by providing a
geometrico-topological model for it. Finally, the axiom-system will be sig­
nificantly extended and given an ontological interpretation that is very plau­
sibly in agreement with the intentions of Thomas Aquinas. The texts referred
to are the Summa theologiae, Summa contra gentiles, De ente et essentia, and
In Aristotelis librum de anima commentarium.
II
Before I begin, some remarks concerning method are in order. This essay has
been written in the conviction that the logical reconstruction of philosophical
doctrines from the history of philosophy can be of value for our understand­
ing of them (if they can be at all subjected to such a treatment). This convic­
tion is not uncontroversial. It is in the nature of a logical reconstruction that
it contains certain deviations from the original that is being reconstructed.
In a logical reconstruction inconsistencies are avoided -  that is, inessential
inconsistencies due to carelessness; for essentially inconsistent theories are
not amenable to logical reconstruction. (Sometimes, however, an attempt at
logical reconstruction is necessary in order to show that a philosophical the­
ory is essentially inconsistent.) In a logical reconstruction instances of am­
biguity and vagueness may be clarified into alternative non-ambiguous and
non-vague logical sub-reconstructions. The theoretical horizon of a logical
reconstruction is normally wider than that of the original text: it normally
points out conclusions that the author of the original did not think of, or at
least did not mention; these ‘new insights’, however, must not be contrary
to the spirit of the original; if they were, the logical reconstruction would
be inadequate. A logical reconstruction employs logical resources of which
the author had no, or only an inadequate, idea. A logical reconstruction de­
rives conclusions that the author of the original merely stated on the strength
of his intuitions or arrived at by entirely inconclusive arguments. A logical
reconstruction is more, sometimes much more, systematic than the original,
connecting results that are not connected in the original. But it may also dis-
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connect results that are connected in the original, if no justifiable logical bond
can be found between them.
If the original text is open to logical reconstruction, then the mentioned
deviations of its logical reconstruction from it -  if they remain within limits
-  will contribute not to its distortion but rather to its clarification, revealing,
as it were, what the author would have said if he had had the modem logical
techniques at his disposal.
I l l
The present logical reconstruction refers to the ontological doctrines of Thom­
as Aquinas concerning the composition (composition of existent objects2 -
that is, of res in the appropriate sense: of substances (substantiae primae),
and also of quasi-substances, i.e., human souls and God3 -  by their (ontolog­
ically) fundamental aspects. Aquinas recognizes five fundamental aspects of
an object: its matter, its pure substantial form, its being, its essence, and its
2In what follows, the word “object’ is always to be taken in the sense of "existent object”.
Moreover, it should always be born in mind that the rather nondescript term “object” is
here being used in a special, technical sense: to refer to the bearers (or possessors) of the
fundamental compositional aspects that Thomas’s doctrines are about. The use of the term
“object” in this essay must not be taken to imply a depreciation of the dignity of what it is
applied to (as when human beings and God are said to be “objects”).
'Note that the Thomasic reason for God's quasi-substantiality is quite different from the
reason for the quasi-substantiality of human souls. Human souls, according to Thomas,
are not substances in the full (or strong) sense because, although they can and do for some
time exist on their own (according to Thomas), without a body, their disembodied form of
existence is not their normal or natural state; in their normal or natural state, they are parts
of human beings and thus have an imperfection which prevents them from being substances
in the full (strong) sense (see Summa theologiae, 1, 29, 1, and 1, 75. 2). God, according to
Thomas, is not a substance in the proper sense because God is not in any category (genus)
and because ‘substance’ in the proper sense is a category (see Summa theologiae, 1, 3. 5).
It seems that Thomas’s main motivation in excluding God from the genus of substance is to
stress the incomparability of God in relation to the created beings. -  Thomas nevertheless
applies ‘substantia’ to the human soul and to God on several occasions; for example, such a
use of ‘substantia’ is evidently implied in quotations 40 and 46 in this essay. The best w'ay
to deal with this situation is to say that Thomas is using ‘substantia’ on such occasions in an
analogically extended sense; that, in literal parlance, he is saying that the human soul and
God are subsistences (i.e., objects: substances or quasi-substances)-, cf. the Sed contra of
Summa theologiae, 1, 75, 2, where ‘substantia’ is defined -  not in the full and not in the
proper sense, but in the analogically extended sense -  merely as aliquid subsistens).
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actuating substantial form. It should be noted that a substantial form is not
ipso facto -  qua substantial form -  a form which is a substance; it is. qua sub­
stantial form, merely a fundamental form of a substance or quasi-substance.
Accordingly, five functional terms are introduced: m(t), f(t), s(t), w(t),
a(t), where “t” can be replaced by any object-variable or object-name. They
are to be read as ‘the matter of t’, ‘the pure form of t’ (short for ‘the pure
substantial form of t’), ‘the being of t’, ‘the essence of t’, ‘the actuating form
of t’ (short for ‘the actuating substantial form of t’).
Normally, object-aspects are not objects (there are. however, exceptions);
thus it is not generally meaningful to speak, for example, of the essence of
the being of an object, or of the being of the being of an object. The formal
language will consequently be constructed in such a manner that functional
terms embedded in functional terms -  like w(f(t)), s(w(f(t))), f(s(m(t))), etc.
-  are not well-formed. To allow functional terms like the chosen examples to
be well-formed is warranted by nothing in the writings of Aquinas.
According to Aquinas, certain objects have no matter; for such objects the
function the matter o f is initially not defined. However, a complete definition
(that is, a definition for all objects) is secured for this function by assuming
an empty aspect of every object, and by stipulating that if an object has no
matter, then its matter is its empty aspect. Accordingly, the functional term
c(t) is introduced, which is to be read as ‘the empty aspect of t’.
Aspects of the same object, according to Aquinas, combine to form an
aspect of the object or the object itself, and Aquinas -  as has been said -
recognizes five fundamental aspects of an object. Accordingly, we have a
dyadic functor “+” such that only functional expressions with “+” that have
the forms (</>(t) + 0 '(t)), ((0(t) + </>'(t)) + 0"(t)), (0(t) + (</>'(t) + 0"(t))) are
well-formed, where 0, 0 ', 0" may each be replaced by “m”, “f ’, “s” -  and, in
addition, by “c” (though this is non-Thomasic, it is warranted by the benefits
it has for the formulation of Thomasic doctrines, as will be seen). But why is
one not also allowed to replace 0, and <b" each by “w” and “a”? One is not
allowed to do so because the forms of expression presented above refer to the
language without defined expressions (i.e., to the language in basic notation),
and with the help of the composition functor “+” w(t) and a(t) can, in fact, be
defined, in keeping with the writings of Aquinas. The first definition is this:
w(t) :=  (f(t) + m(t)) -  the essence o f an object is its pure form
combined with its matter.
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If one followed Aquinas to the letter, this definition would not be adequate for
all objects; it would only be adequate for material objects. But the introduc­
tion of c(t) makes it possible to regard it as the general definition of essence,
without getting into conflict with Thomasic views. Let “g” designate some
immaterial object; then ‘w(g) =  (f(g) + m(g))’ is equivalent to ‘w(g) =  f(g)’,
where the latter statement corresponds to the Thomasic definition of essence
for immaterial objects: the essence o f an immaterial object is its pure form.
The equivalence is easily proved: Since g is immaterial we have *m(g) =
c(g)’, hence we also have ‘(f(g) + m(g)) =  (f(g) + c(g))’, and therefore ‘(f(g)
+ m(g)) =  f(g)’ -  for the empty aspect of g adds nothing to the pure form of
g. Thomas says:
1. In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae [sive materialis] et sub­
stantiae simplicis [sive immaterialis], quod essentia substantiae compositae
non est tantum forma, sed complectitur formam et materiam; essentia autem
substantiae simplicis est forma tantum (De ente et essentia, caput 4. 25 [of the
continuously enumerated sections]).
Whereas Aquinas, when speaking of composition, always means proper com­
position, that is, the composition of different, non-empty aspects (of the same
object), there is in this reconstruction of his doctrines also a place for im­
proper composition, that is, for the composition of an aspect with itself or
with the empty aspect (of the same object). (By being different, object­
aspects -  at least the fundamental object-aspects considered by Aquinas -
are distinct, since they cannot be proper parts of each other or overlap.)
The second definition is this:
a(t) := (f(t) + s(t)) -  the actuating form o f an object is its pure
form combined with its being (or: the actuating form of an object
is the composition of its pure form and its being).
Aquinas does not verbally distinguish between the actuating form of an ob­
ject and its pure form, and on the whole he seems to be unaware of their being
distinct (in most objects). However, his doctrines can be consistently inter­
preted only by considering the pure form of an object to be normally distinct
from its actuating form. In the following quotations Aquinas is referring to
the actuating form of an object:
2. ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale quando componuntur (De
ente et essentia, 6, 34).
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3. Per formam enim. quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc
aliquid (De ente et essentia, 2, 6).
And Aquinas adds:
4. Unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed
esse actu tale [...] Unde, quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari
simpliciter, sed secundum quid (De ente et essentia, 2, 6).
In the quotation below, however, Aquinas is referring to the pure form of an
object:
5. esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae, nec tantum mate­
riae, sed ipsius compositi; essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur.
Unde oportet ut essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma nec
tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma
sit causa (De ente et essentia. 2, 6b ls).
Here Aquinas names, beside form and matter, a third ultimate component in
the composition of a material substance: its being (esse), whereas in the pre­
vious quotations he only mentions form and matter, obviously intending that
they by themselves suffice to constitute the object. This apparent discrep­
ancy can be resolved by supposing that in the last quotation Aquinas means
by ‘forma’ the pure form of the object, which together with the matter of
the object composes its essence, which in turn enters into composition with
the being of the object to constitute the object itself; whereas in the previous
quotations Aquinas means by ‘forma’ the pure form of the object in com­
position with the object’s being, that is: the actuating form of the object,
which together with the matter of the object composes the object itself. It
amounts to the same whether the pure form and the matter are first composed
to constitute the essence, and then the essence and the being are composed to
constitute the object; or whether the pure form and the being are first com­
posed to constitute the actuating form, and then the actuating form and the
matter are composed to constitute the object.
In the next quotation the first instance of the word ‘forma’ means the
actuating form of the object, the second instance, however, its pure form:
6. In substantiis autem composais ex materia et forma est duplex compositio
actus et potentiae: prima quidem ipsius substantiae, quae componitur ex ma­
teria et forma; secunda vero, ex ipsa substantia iam composita et esse; quae
etiam potest dici ex ‘quod est’ et ‘esse’; vel ex ‘quod est’ et ‘quo est’ (Summa
contra gentiles, liber 2, capitulum 54).
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In this passage, we also have an example of the equivocal use of the word
‘substantia’ in the writings of Aquinas: the first instance of this word signi­
fies the same as ‘res per se subsistens’ ( ‘individual substance’), the second
and third, however, the same as ‘essentia seu natura’ (‘essence’). Aquinas
is quite aware of this equivocation; in Summa theologiae, pars 1, quaestio
29, articulus 2, he explicitly distinguishes the two meanings of ‘substantia’
(following Aristotle):
7. substantia dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei,
quam significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat
substantiam rei: quam quidem substantiam Graeci usiam vocant. quod nos
essentiam dicere possumus. -  Alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel
suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae.
In contrast, Aquinas seems not to be aware of the equivocation in his use
of the word ‘forma’; he apparently does not differentiate between what we
have here been calling ’the pure form' and what we have here been calling
‘the actuating form’ of an object. The identification of what, on the strength
of his own theory, is non-identical is bound to lead to some confusion, as
we shall see (in section VIII. subsequent to quotation 11). (Thomas’s use of
‘forma’ for stating what is valid in his ontology of the actuating form of an
object is, it seems, predominant over his use of ‘forma’ for stating what is
valid in his ontology of the pure form of an object.)
The matter of a material object cannot enter into composition with the
being of that object (while the pure form of any object enters into composition
with the being of that object to constitute its actuating form); there is no
‘actuating matter' of a material object. Matter is actuated by the actuating
form (see quotations 2 and 3); the complementary view that pure form is
actuated by the actuating matter is absurd for Aquinas; not matter but pure
form is the ‘vehicle’ (and actuating form the effective ‘bringer’) of being:4
4 The pure form and the being it carries are. in combination, the actuating form.
8. Forma tarnen potest dici ‘quo est’, secundum quod est essendi principium
(Summa contra gentiles, 2, 54).
9. quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa (the last phrase of
quotation 5).
10. materia vero non habet esse nisi per formant (De ente et essentia, 6, 36).
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In consequence, the composition function is initially not defined if its argu­
ments are the matter of a material object and the being of that object. How­
ever. we can stipulate that, for any material object, the composition of its
matter with its being is its empty aspect.
IV
On the basis of Thomasic doctrine, the possibilities of expression by means
of the composition functor *+’ are drastically limited in the intended formal
language. The limitations can be summed up as follows (leaving aside the
limitation that does not directly concern compositional expressions, namely,
that there is to be no embedding of functional terms in functional terms):
(a) A well-formed compositional expression in basic notation contains at
most two instances of *+’.
(b) Only expressions having the form f(t), m(t), s(t), c(t) may occur in
a well-formed compositional expression in basic notation (i.e.. without
defined expressions) as argument expressions that are not themselves
compositional expressions.
(c) Either exactly one object-variable or exactly one object-name occurs in
a well-formed compositional expression.
These restrictions can be justified as follows:
(a') Thomas Aquinas does not consider more complex compositions than
can be expressed by compositional expressions in basic notation that
contain at most two instances of *+*.
(b') Aquinas does not in general consider the composition of an object with
an object, or of an object with an object-aspect; he only considers the
composition of an object-aspect with an object-aspect, where the non­
composed object-aspects are, for Aquinas, pure form, matter, and being
-  with the empty aspect added as a technical tool for theory building.
(Occasionally, however, an object-aspect is identical with an object.)
(c7) Aquinas does not in general consider the composition of aspects of dif­
ferent objects; he only considers the composition of aspects of the same
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object. (Occasionally, however, an aspect of one object is identical with
an aspect of another object.)
In spite of the restrictions just described, it is still possible to generate in­
finitely many well-formed compositional expressions. But this is possible
only if there are infinitely many object-designators, because for each object­
designator (object-variable or object-name) the number of well-formed com­
positional expressions ‘around’ it is finite.
The axiom-system will be constructed in such a manner as to make prov­
able that all well-formed compositional expressions around the object-desig­
nator t are reducible to t, c(t), m(t), f(t), s(t), w(t) [:= (f(t) + m(t))], or a(t)
[:= (f(t) + s(t))]. As has been said, Aquinas recognizes only five fundamental
aspects of an object. In addition to those five aspects, we have, for reasons
of formal simplification, the empty aspect of an object. By composition of
aspects of an object, there issues an aspect of the object (one of the six) or
the object itself. In special cases the reduction of compositional expressions
can be carried further. For example, if t designates an immaterial object, we
have m(t) =  c(t) and w(t) =  f(t).
Which predicates should belong to the envisaged formal language? As
basic (undefined) predicate, for now only the identity-predicate *=’ is to be
a constituent of it. With respect to the sentences and open sentences that are
generable with the help of ‘= ’, no further restrictions are imposed: such re­
strictions -  as, for example, requiring that one and the same object-designator
(on its own. in a functional term, or in a compositional expression) has to oc­
cur on the left side and the right side of ‘= ’ -  would not be justifiable by the
writings of Aquinas. As will become apparent, a great many other predicates
for Thomasic ontological distinctions can be defined with the help of the
identity-predicate, the aspect-expressions, and the logical expressions. The
rendering of ‘est’ by ‘is identical with’ in the present context of consider­
ing the Thomasic doctrine of the composition of objects by their aspects is,
of course, a matter of interpretation; this rendering can be said to be over­
whelmingly suggested by the relevant passages in the writings of Aquinas.
V
The reflections in sections III and IV are summed up and made precise by the
following definition of the formal language T:
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1. Object-variables (OVs) of T
(a) ‘x’ is an OV of T;
(b) if t is an OV of T, then t' is an OV of T;
(c) OVs of T are only expressions that are generable by (a) and (b).
2. Object-names (ONs) of T
(a) ‘g’ is an ON of T;
(b) if t is an ON of T, then t' is an ON of T;
(c) ONs of T are only expressions that are generable by (a) and (b).
3. Object-designators (ODs) of T
t is an OD of T iff t is an OV of T or an ON of T.
4. Primary aspect-expressions (PAEs) of T
(a) If t is an OD of T, then m(t), f(t), s(t) and c(t) are PAEs of T;
(b) PAEs of T are only expressions that are generable by (a).
5. Secondary aspect-expressions (SAEs) of T
(a) If t is an OD of T and 0(t) and 0 '(t) are PAEs of T. then (0(t) + 0'(t)) is
aSAE ofT;
(b) SAEs of T are only expressions that are generable by (a).
6. Aspect-expressions (AEs) of T
(a) PAEs and SAEs of T are AEs of T;
(b) if t is an OD of T and 0(t) is a PAE of T and (0'(t) + 0"(t)) is a SAE of
T, then (0(t) + (0'(t) + 0"(t))) and ((0'(t) + </>"(t)) + 0(t)) are AEs of T;
(c) AEs of T are only expressions that are generable by (a) and (b).
7. Compositional expressions (CEs) of T
ß is a CE of T iff ß is an AE of T but not a PAE of T.
8. Tertiary aspect-expressions (TAEs) of T
y is a TAE of T iff y is an AE of T but neither a PAE nor a SAE of T.
9. Entity-designators (EDs) of T
5 is an ED of T iff 8 is an OD or an AE of T.
10. Primary sententials (PSLs) of T
(a) If 8 and 5 ' are EDs of T. then (5 =  5 ') is a PSL of T;
(b) PSLs of T are only expressions that are generable by (a).
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11. Sententials (SLs) of T
(a) PSLs of T are SLs of T;
(b) if a  and o ' are SLs of T, then -><y, (o Ao-'), (o’Vo'), (o  d  o '), (o  =  o ')
are SLs of T;
(c) if o  is a SL of T in which in certain places X there occurs the ON v of T.
and if v  is an OV of T that does not occur in o  and replaces v in all places X
in o. with the SL o[u] resulting from o, then Vvo[u] and 3uo[u] are SLs
ofT;
(d) SLs of T are only expressions that are generable by (a), (b), and (c).
12. Primary sentences (PSs) of T
o  is a PS of T iff o  is a PSL of T in which no OV of T occurs.
13. Sentences (Ss) of T
o  is a S of T iff o  is a SL of T in which no OV of T occurs free.
1 .-13 . determines the syntax of T. The intended interpretation of T has been
outlined, but of course there remains much to be said about it. The logical
operators A, V, D, = , V, 3 are to be read as ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or* (in the sense
of 'not neither ..., nor ...’), ‘i f ..., then ...’ (truth-functionally understood), ‘...
if and only i f ...’ (truth-functionally understood), ‘for all objects’, ‘for some
object*. Finally, parentheses can be omitted in accordance with the following
rules:
i. External parentheses can be omitted.
ii. In the sequence +, = , A, V, D, = , syntactic binding-power is decreas­
ing from left to right.5
iii. In a conjunction (disjunction) the parentheses around the first and second
member of the conjunction (disjunction) can be omitted if that member
is itself a conjunction (disjunction).
’Note that this rule allows to write ->5 =  8' instead of ->(5 = 8'). This certainly requires
some accustoming. If one writes (5 3') as a definitional variant of ->(0 = S'), then
(difference) binds as strongly as *=’ (identity). Thus one can write /  8' instead of
-(<S /  §') [or (6 = 8'), or —  8 = 5'].
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VI
Before proceeding to the formulation of an axiom-system in T that is ad­
equate, in the intended interpretation of T, for capturing part of Thomas
Aquinas's ontology, the logic has to be described by the use of which the­
orems are to be deduced from the axioms. That logic is classical first-order
predicate-logic with identity and functions. However, there is one restric­
tion to this logic in this particular case of its application: Only ODs of T
are quantifiable, which means that the deduction rules Vdct  [v ] —> o  8 and
a  8 —> 3v<r v ] := ‘logically implies’) may only be applied if 5 is an
OD of T (and not just any ED of T); the appropriate form of those deduc­
tion rules for the present purposes can, therefore, be represented like this:
Vua[u] —> er t] and ct [t] -> Svcr'v].6 This restriction is in keeping with the
intended interpretation of V and 3 as ‘for all objects’, ‘for some object’, be­
cause, under the intended interpretation of AEs of T. an AE of T, for example
“f(#/)”5 will normally not refer to an object but only to an aspect of it. As­
pects of objects which are not objects are not quantified over. It is, moreover,
impossible to refer to them directly, that is, to refer to them without refer­
ring at the same time to some object. This is a consequence of there being
no simple names in T for aspects of objects that are not objects. Under the
intended interpretation, these reference-semantic features mirror the ontolog­
ically dependent status of object-aspects which are not objects, in contrast to
the ontologically independent status of objects. Thomas Aquinas would have
said that object-aspects which are not objects are less real (have less being)
than objects; the former have their being only in the latter.
6 It goes without saying that if a[t] is deduced from Vvojv] and t is a variable of T, that
then t is to be a variable that is free in cr[t] (not bound by a quantifier in <y[t]) at least in the
intended places of substituting t for v.
~The restriction is automatically fulfilled if one replaces “3” by “t” in the second-order
deduction rules (it being understood that “t” stands only for an OD of T).
Note that the second-order deduction rules for V: If o ' —> o  <5], then o ’ —>
Vv<T. V , provided 8 does not occur free in o ’ -> Vvcrfv], and the second-
order deduction rule for 3: If  cr[5̂  -» o'. then 3ucr[v1 —> o', provided 8
does not occur free in 3vcr u] —> o', can in any case (that is, whether one
has the representation of Thomas Aquinas’s views in mind or not) only be
truthfully formulated with the restriction that 8 is to be an OD of T.7 Without
that restriction, counterexamples can be found, for example, the following
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counterexample to the second-order deduction rule for 3: It is true that f(g7) =
g' -¥  3x(f(x) = x ), and that f(g7)does not occur in 3x7(.r7 — g f  —> 3x(f(x) =  x);
but, obviously, 3x!(x! = g') does not logically imply 3x(f(x) =  x).
Since only ODs of T are quantifiable and we nevertheless want to make
unrestricted use of the deduction-rules referring to identity, the basic deduction­
rules for identity cannot be formulated in the following manner: —> Vx(x =
x), —> VxVx7(x =  x7 D (<y[x] D G’fx7])). And they can also not be formulated
in the following manner: —> t =  t, -> t =  t7 D (a[t] D cr[t7] ). Rather, they
must be put in the following way: —> 5 =  5. —> 5 =  5 7 D (crfö] D cH57])
(where 5 is any ED of T).
VII
The axiom-system TO (‘Thomasic ontology’) consists of the following ax­
ioms (arranged into groups; the first group is presented via axiom-schemata):
(In what follows 0[u] and 0 7[v] is a PAE or a SAE of T having u as its
OV. Note that in (0^v] +  0 % ]) not both 0[v] and can be SAEs of T -
according to the syntax of T.)
A 1 Every S of T having the form
Vu(0[u] +  0'[v] =  0 7[u] +  0[u])
is an axiom of TO.
A2 (a) Every S of T having the form
Vv(0[v] +  0[v] =  0[v])
is an axiom of TO.
(b) Every S of T having the form
Vv(0[v] + c (u )  =  0[v])
is an axiom of TO.
A3 Every S of T having the form
Vt)(0[u] +  0'[v] =  0[v] D 0 7[v] =  0 u] V 0 7[u] = c ( u ) )
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is an axiom of TO.B 1 Vx(x =  (f(x) 4- m(x)) 4- s(x))B2 Vx((f(x) 4- m(x)) 4- s(x) =  (f(x) 4- s(x)) +  m(x))B3 (a) Vx->f(x) =  m(x) [or: Vx(f(x) m(x))](b) Vx->s(x) =  m(x)(c) Vx->f(x) 4- s(x) =  m(x)8 [or: Vx(f(x) 4- s(x) m(x))]
8 For reading this, remember that “+” binds more strongly than “= ”, and “= ” more
strongly than
B4 (a) Vx->x =  c(x)(b) Vx-TCx) =  c(x)(c) Vx->s(x) =  c(x)(d) Vx->f(x) 4- s(x) =  c(x)(e) Vx-f(x) 4- m(x) =  c(x)B5 Vx(x =  f(x) D m(x) =  c(x))B6 Vx(->m(x) =  c(x) D m(x) 4- s(x) =  c(x))B7 Vx(--m(x) =  c(x) D (f(x) 4- m(x)) 4- f(x) =  c(x) A (f(x) +  m(x)) 4- m(x) =c(x))B8 Vx(~T(x) =  s(x) D (f(x)4-s(x)) 4-f(x) =  c(x) A (f(x)4- s(x)) 4-s(x) =  c(x))
Concerning A 1 : The composition-function is commutative. The compositionof aspect a  of an object and aspect ß of the same object is identical with thecomposition of aspect ß of that object with aspect a  of that object. Aquinaswould surely have agreed.
Concerning A2 and A3: The conjunction of A2(a) and A2(b) is logicallyequivalent with the converse of A3, that is, with Vu(0'[u] =  0[v] V =c(u) D <j>[v] 4- </>'[u] =  O[u]), from which we obtain A2*: Vl)(0'[u] =  0[u] V0'[U] =  C(U) V 0[v] =  C(ü) D 0[u] 4- 0'[V] =  </>[V] V 0'[V] 4- </>[v] =  </>'[«]).From A3, on the other hand, we get A3*: V u (0 [vj 4- 0'[v] =  0[v V 0'[u] 4-
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0 [v] = D 0'[v] =  0 u] V0'[u] =  c(v) V0ïv] =  c(u)). This means that
from A2 and A3 there follows a pair of theorem-schemata (i.e., A2* and A3*)
that state the sufficient and necessary condition for improper composition,
that is, composition that is not properly speaking composition. There has
already been occasion to mention that object-aspects cannot be proper parts
of each other; otherwise, A2 and A3 could not be formulated in the manner
presented above, but would have to take care of the possibility that ‘0'[v]
is a proper part of is true. (Of course one may, in a sense, truthfully
say ‘m(g) is a proper part of w(g) [:= f(g) + m(g)]’; but this is analogous to
saying ‘object a is a proper part of the proposition that F(a)’, not analogous
to saying ‘Âx(x =  a)9 is a proper part of Ax(x =  aV.r =  b) [presupposing
a b]’. If it were analogous to the latter, then, indeed, we would have for a
material object g: w(g) + m(g) =  w(g), and at the same time: ->m(g) =  w(g)
and -im(g) =  c(g), in other words: we would have a counterexample to A3.)
9 Let A’ be the operator of class-abstraction. Thus, AxA[x] is the class of all x such that
A[x], which class can also be designated (a little bit less concisely) like this: {x: A[x]}.
Concerning Bl: An object is composed of its essence and its being, and
its essence is, in turn, composed of its pure (substantial) form and its matter.
Aquinas states this explicitly for material objects (see quotation 6). In view
of the possibility that the matter of an object is its empty aspect, we can make
his statement apply to all objects -  without incurring any consequences that
contradict his doctrine (as will amply be seen below).
Concerning B2: We have already given a justification of this axiom above
(in the middle of section III): The composition of essence and being is iden­
tical with the composition of actuating form and matter. For this reason,
Aquinas sometimes says that a material object is composed of its form (that
is, its actuating form) and its matter (see for instance quotation 2). and some­
times that there is a double composition in a material object: its essence is
composed of its form (that is, its pure form) and its matter, and the material
object itself is composed of its essence and its being (see quotation 6). Again
the possibility that the matter of an object is its empty aspect, allows us to
make an insight primarily reached for material objects apply to all objects
(without in any way contradicting Thomas).
It must be emphasized that B2 is far from stating the associativity of *+’;
in fact, the assumption of the associativity of *+’ would make TO almost
inconsistent: Assume -^m(x) =  c(x); hence by B5: ->x =  f(x); and by B6:
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m(x) + s(x) =  c(x); by Bl, B2. and the hypothetical associativity of ‘+’: x =
f(x) + (s(x) + m(x)): hence by m(x) + s(x) =  c(x) [and in view of Al]: x =  f(x)
+ c(x); hence by A2(b): x =  f(x) -  contradiction. Thus, if the associativity
of *+’ were assumed, TO would be saved from being inconsistent only by
the non-assumption of 3x->m(x) =  c(x) (which assertion, however, is utterly
plausible, considering that it is just about undeniable that some objects are
material objects).
Concerning B3: B3 is evident in the light of the ontology of Aquinas.
Neither the pure form nor the actuating form nor the being of an object is its
matter. It will be proved below that no object is its matter and that the essence
of no object is the matter of the object.
Concerning B4: This axiom characterizes the empty aspect o f -  an aspect­
function Aquinas does not consider -  in relation to the other aspect-functions
and in relation to objects, in the following manner: The empty aspect of an
object and the object itself, or an aspect of the object that is not designated as
the matter o f it, are in no case identical to one another. B4 does not exclude
that the empty aspect of some object is its matter.
Concerning B5: Under the intended interpretation, B5 says that if an
object is its pure form, that then it is an immaterial object -  which completely
agrees with what Aquinas says about objects that are forms.
Concerning B6, B7, B8: Axiom B6 has already been justified above (at
the end of section III); it expresses the stipulation there proposed. The axioms
B7 and B8 have the same role as B6: the role of completing the definition of
the composition-function for cases in which it is initially not defined. We
have no information as to what Aquinas considered to result by the compo­
sition of the essence and the pure form, or the essence and the matter, of a
material object; and we have no information as to what Aquinas considered
to result by the composition of the actuating form and the pure form, or the
actuating form and the being, of an object whose pure form and being are dif­
ferent. Hence we must consider the composition-function to be initially not
defined for these cases. (Concerning the composition of the matter and the
being of a material object, we have positive evidence that Aquinas regarded
it as impossible: being can come to matter only via form; see quotation 10.)
B6, B7, and B8 may be called “the reduction-axioms”, from the important
role they play in the reduction of all AEs around a given OD to basic AEs
around it or to the OD itself. This reduction, programmatically described in
section IV, will be carried out in section X. The uses of B7 and B8 in the
Thomas Aquinas on the Fundamental Composition o f Objects 135
logical reconstruction of Thomasic ontology are. however, not exhaustively
described by these remarks. The impression of an ad hoc character of B7 and
B8 will be dispelled as we move on to the proving of theorems.
In view of the intended interpretation of TO relative to Thomasic doctrine,
I repeat two definitions (but now as part of the formal exposition; concerning
the Thomas-interpretational justification of the definitions, see section III):
D 1 w(t) :=  (f(t) + m(t)) (for all ODs t of T)
D2 a(t) :=  (f(t) + s(t)) (for all ODs t of T)
V III
Tl Vx(m(x) =  c(x) D x =  a(x))
(An immaterial object is its actuating form)
Proof : Assume m(x) =  c(x); by B 1. x =  (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x); hence x =  (f(x)
+ c(x)) + s(x); by A2(b), f(x) + c(x) =  f(x): hence x =  f(x) + s(x), hence by
D2: x =  a(x).
T2 Vx(x =  a(x) D m(x) =  c(x))
(An object that is its actuating form is immaterial)
Proof : Assume x =  a(x); hence by D2: x =  f(x) + s(x); by B 1, x =  (f(x) +
m(x)) + s(x); hence f(x) + s(x) =  (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x); by B2. (f(x) + m(x)) +
s(x) =  (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x); hence f(x) + s(x) =  (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x), and hence
(f(x) + s(x)) + m(x) =  f(x) + s(x); hence by A3: m(x) =  f(x) +  s(x) V m(x) =
c(x); by B3(c), ->m(x) =  f(x) +  s(x); hence m(x) =  c(x).
T3 Vx(m(x) == c(x) D w(x) =  f(x))
(The essence o f an immaterial object is its (pure) form)
Proof : Assume m(x) =  c(x); by DI, w(x) =  f(x) + m(x); hence w(x) =  f(x) +
c(x); by A2(b), f(x) + c(x) =  f(x); hence w(x) =  f(x).
T4 Vx(w(x) =  f(x) D m(x) =  c(x))
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(An object whose essence is its form is an immaterial object)
Proof: Assume w(x) =  f(x), hence by DI: f(x) + m(x) =  f(x), hence by A3:
m(x) =  f(x) V m(x) =  c(x); by B3(a), ^m(x) =  f(x); hence m(x) =  c(x).
Concerning T3 and T4, see quotation 1. Concerning T1, consider the follow­
ing quotation:
11. In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus
individuatio non est per materiam individualem, id est per hanc materiam, sed
ipsae formae per se individuantur. oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita
subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura (Summa theologiae,
1,3, 3).
This evidence for T1 is somewhat vitiated by the fact that Thomas, in the
quoted passage, transfers what is valid of actuating form to pure form -  which
he shouldn’t do (if his ontology is to be coherent). The context makes it clear
that, in momentary confusion, he in fact intends to assert, ‘All immaterial ob­
jects are their pure forms’.10 But. by Thomas Aquinas’s own lights, it is of
course false that all immaterial objects are their pure forms. A created imma­
terial object (an angel, for example) is not its pure form, and consequently -
since the essence of an immaterial object is its pure form -  it is not its essence.
Aquinas, however, deduces from “All immaterial objects are their pure forms’
-  with the correct presupposition that the essence of an immaterial object is
its pure form -  ‘All immaterial objects are their essence’ ( ‘Unde in eis non
differt suppositum et natura’). In other places, Thomas is quite clear about
the fact (in his ontology) that a created immaterial object is not its pure form
-  because its being is distinct from its essence, that is, from its pure form:
12. Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in
quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia
(De ente et essentia, 5,31).
13. oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse praeter formam; et ideo dictum est
quod intelligentia est forma et esse (De ente et essentia. 4. 26).11
10In the article from which quotation 11 is taken, Thomas quite generally identifies
essence -  ‘essentia vel natura’ -  and pure form ‘[quae] comprehendit in se ilia tantum quae
cadunt in definitione speciei’, which is contradicting what he says in other places; see for
example quotation 5.
1 'These assertions do not hinder Aquinas from also asserting, in the very same work (and
rather close to the location from where quotation 13 is taken): ‘intelligentiae quidditas est
ipsamet intelligentia, ideo quidditas vel essentia eius est ipsum quod est ipsa’ (De ente et
essentia. 4, 28).
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This means that a created immaterial object is properly composed of its being
and its essence, that is, its pure form; hence it is not identical with its pure
form. Thus, Thomas by the equivocation in his use of the word ‘forma’ is
led to imagining a proposition valid relative to pure form  which is not valid
relative thereto, but rather valid relative to actuating form : Tn his igitur quae
non sunt composita ex materia et forma [...] oportet quod ipsae formae sint
supposita subsistentia’ (see quotation 11).
T2 says about objects that are their actuating forms what B5 says about
objects that are their pure forms: that they are immaterial. If B5 agrees with
Thomasic doctrine (and it does), so does T2.
T5 Vx(m(x) =  c(x) A ->w(x) =  s(x) D ->x =  f(x))
(An immaterial created object is not its pure form')
Proof : Assume m(x) =  c(x) A iw (x) =  s(x); hence by T3: w(x) =  f(x); by
B 1 and DI : x =  w(x) + s(x); hence x =  f(x) +  s(x) A ->f(x) =  s(x). Assume
x =  f(x); hence f(x) =  f(x) + s(x), and hence f(x) + s(x) =  f(x); hence by
A3: s(x) =  f(x) V s(x) =  c(x); hence by B4(c): s(x) =  f(x) -  contradicting
-T(x) =  s(x).
T6 Vx(->x =  f(x) A m(x) =  c(x) D ->x =  w(x))
(An immaterial object that is not its pure form is not its essence)
Proof: Assume -«x =  f(x) Am(x) =  c(x); hence by T3: w(x) =  f(x); hence
=  w(x).
T5 and T6 formally state as provable theorems the Thomasic principles that
I have just now (above, in front of quotation 12) made use of.
T7 Vx(x =  f(x) D x  =  a(x) Ax =  s(x) Ax = w(x))
(An object that is its pure form is its actuating form, its being, and its
essence)
Proof : Assume x =  f(x); hence by B5: m(x) =  c(x); hence by Tl: x =  a(x);
hence by D2: x =  f(x) + s(x); hence f(x) + s(x) =  f(x); hence by A3: s(x) =
f(x) V s(x) =  c(x); hence by B4(c): s(x) =  f(x): hence x =  s(x); hence by B 1 :
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s(x) =  (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x); hence by A l: s(x) + (f(x) + m(x)) =  s(x); hence
by A3: f(x) +  m(x) =  s(x) Vf(x) +  m(x) =  c(x); hence by B4(e) and Dl: w(x)
=  s(x); hence x =  w(x).
T7 contains a (Thomasically valid) principle -  namely, Vx(x =  f(x) D x  =
w(x)) -  which Aquinas may be implicitly using in quotation 11 to obtain from
the (Thomasically) invalid sentence Vx(m(x) =  c(x) D x =  f(x)) the likewise
invalid sentence Vx(m(x) =  c(x) D x  =  w(x)). Other principles Aquinas may
be using in quotation 11 when validly obtaining the said invalid conclusion
from the said invalid premise are the following: Vx(m(x) =  c(x) D w(x) =
f(x)) (i.e., T3; this is the most likely candidate) and Vx(x =  f(x) A m(x) =
c(x) D x =  w(x)). The last-mentioned principle is, relative to B5, equivalent
with Vx(x =  f(x) D x =  w(x)). Therefore, since that principle (the first one
mentioned in the last sentence) is very easy to prove, there is a far easier way
of arriving at Vx(x =  f(x) D x =  w(x)) than the way via the proof of T7:
T8 Vx(x =  f(x) A m(x) =  c(x) D x =  w(x))
(An immaterial object that is its pure form is its essence)
Proof: Assume x =  f(x) A m(x) =  c(x); hence by T3: w(x) — f(x); hence x =
w(x).
T7 implies that objects that are their pure form are, in a certain sense, simple
objects', we will have occasion to come back to this.
T9 Vx(x =  w(x) D w(x) =  s(x))
(An object that is its essence is uncreated)
Proof: Assume x =  w(x); by B 1 and DI: x =  w(x) + s(x); hence w(x) + s(x)
=  w(x); hence by A3: s(x) =  w(x) V s(x) =  c(x); hence by B4(c): w(x) =  s(x).
T 10 Vx(w(x) =  s(x) D x =  w(x))
(An uncreated object is its essence)
Proof : Assume w(x) =  s(x); by B 1 and DI : x =  w(x) + s(x); hence x =  s(x)
+ s(x); hence by A2(a): x =  s(x); hence x =  w(x).
The proof of T10 already contains the proof of
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Tl 1 Vx(w(x) =  s(x) D x  =  s(x))
(An uncreated object is its being)
And we also have
T12 Vx(x =  s(x) D w(x) =  s(x))
(An object that is its being is uncreated)
Proof'. Assume x =  s(x); by B 1 and D 1 : x =  w(x) + s(x); hence w(x) + s(x) =
s(x); hence by A 1 : s(x) + w(x) =  s(x); hence by A3: w(x) =  s(x) V w(x) =  c(x),
hence by B4(e) and DI: w(x) — s(x).
We have all the time been reading ”m(x) =  c(x)” as ‘x is an immaterial object’,
and “w(x) =  s(x)” as ‘x is an uncreated object’. According to stipulation, the
matter of an object is its empty aspect if the object is immaterial; if, on the
other hand, the object is material, then, clearly, its matter is not its empty
aspect. This justifies reading “m(x) =  c(x)” as ‘x is an immaterial object’.
Moreover, according to Aquinas, the totality of objects is divided into the
one uncreated object, God, and the many created objects. God is the only
object whose essence is its being:
14. Hine est quod Exodi III proprium nomen Dei ponitur esse “QUI EST ”:
quia eius solius proprium est quod sua substantia non sit aliud quam suum
esse (Sumina contra gentiles, 2, 52).
Consequently, the essence of every uncreated object is its being, and every
object whose essence is its being is uncreated. The second statement in the
following quotation is logically equivalent to the second conjunct of the pre­
ceding sentence:
15. cuilibet rei creatae suum esse est ei per aliud: alias non esset creatum.
Nullius igitur substantiae creatae suum esse est sua substantia (Summa contra
gentiles, 2, 52).12
12 Here the word “substantia” is used in two senses in one sentence. But this is harmless,
since the relational character of the second use of “substantia”, and the lack of that character
in the first use, is rather obvious. Aquinas was certainly aware of it.
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These considerations justify the reading of “w(x) =  s(x)” as ‘x is an uncreated
object'. To make the two readings which have just been justified “official”
(i.e., formally dignified), and in order to have convenient building blocks for
further predicate-formation in TO. I introduce the following two definitions:
D3 M(t) :=  -m (t) =  c(t) (for all ODs t of T)
D4 C(t) :=  iw (t) =  s(t)
With the help of the predicates M(t) and C(t), the four principal Thomasic
categories of objects can be defined:
D5 D(t) : = ->M(t) A -’C(t)
D6 I(t):= -.M (t)A C (t)
D7 E(t) := M (t)A iC (t)
D8 B (t):=M (t)A C (t)
According to the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, the third category (given by
D7) is empty. There are no material uncreated objects (for example, elementa
in the sense of the Pre-Socratics, having a quasi-divine character):
16. Per hoc autem [quod omnia quae sunt a Deo suntj excluditur antiquorum
Naturalium error, qui ponebant corpora quaedam non habere causam essendi.
Et etiam quorumdam qui dicunt Deum non esse causam substantiae caeli. sed
solum motus (Summa contra gentiles, 2, 15).
In TO we can prove
T13 -ExE(x)
(There are no material uncreated objects)
Proof -. By D7, ->3xE(x) is equivalent to ->3x(M(x)A-^C(x)), hence to Vx(M(x)
D C(x)), which is equivalent, by D3 and D4, to Vx(->m(x) =  c(x) D ->w(x) =
s(x)), hence to Vx(w(x) =  s(x) D m(x) =  c(x)). The latter can be proved as
follows: Assume w(x) =  s(x); hence s(x) + f(x) =  w(x) + f(x); hence by DI:
s(x) + f(x) =  (f(x) + m(x)) + f(x); by B4(d): ~>f(x) + s(x) =  c(x); hence by
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Al: ->s(x) + f(x) =  c(x); hence ->(f(x) + m(x)) + f(x) =  c(x); hence by B7:
m(x) =  c(x).
From quotation 14 we may gather: I f  the being o f x  is caused by an entity-
other than x, then the being o f x is different from the essence o f x.13 The
converse -  I f  the being o fx is  different from the essence ofx, then the being o f
x is caused by an entity other than x -  is also valid, according to Aquinas. As
evidence for this, one can point to quotation 15, or to the following quotation:
13I argue via contraposition: Suppose the being of x  is identical with the essence of x;
hence -  in view of quotation 14 -  x is identical with God; hence the being of x is not caused
by an entity other than x (else, the being of God would be caused by an entity other than God
-  which is absurd). Therefore: If the being o fx  is caused by an entity other than x. then the
being o fx  is different from the essence ofx.
17. oportet quod omnis talis res, cuius [esse] est aliud quam natura sua. habeat
esse ab alio (De ente et essentia, 4, 27; see also Summa theologiae, 1, 3,4).
Hence we can read “C(x)” -  that is, “-iw(x) =  s(x)” -  also as ‘the being of x is
caused by an entity other than x’. and “iC (x)” -  which is logically equivalent
to “w(x) =  s(x)” -  also as ‘the being of x is not caused by an entity other than
x’ -  which for Thomas is equivalent to ‘the being of x is not caused by any
entity’, since self-causation is, according to him. impossible:
18. nec tarnen invenitur. nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui
ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossible (Summa theologiae, 1,
2, 3).
19. Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel
quidditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente; quia sic aliqua res esset causa sui
ipsius, et aliqua res seipsam in esse produceret. quod est impossibile (De ente
et essentia, 4, 27).
From T13 we can easily deduce:
T14 Vx(M(x) =  B(x))
(The material objects are the created bodies)
Proof-. From T13 by use of D7: Vx(M(x) D C(x)); hence Vx(M(x) =  M(x) A
C(x)); hence by D8: Vx(M(x) =  B(x)).
T15 Vx(->C(x) =  D(x))
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(The uncreated -  uncaused -  objects are the divine objects)
Proof : From T13: Vx(-C(x) d  ->M(x )); hence Vx(->C(x) =  ->M(x) A-«C(x));
hence by D5: Vx(^C(x) =  D(x)).
D5 mirrors the Thomasic conception of divinity: a divine object is an uncre­
ated (uncaused) immaterial object. This conception is the Judaeo-Christian
conception of divinity, but with a special Aristotelian touch that results by
taking ‘uncreated object’ to mean an object whose essence is its being.
It does not follow from Thomas’s theory of object-composition alone that
there are divine objects, or that there are (created) intelligences (‘substantiae
creatae intellectuales [immateriales]’, ‘intelligentiae’), or indeed that there
are (created) bodies ( ‘corpora’). Accordingly, neither 3xD(x) nor 3x1 (x) nor
3xB(x) (nor their negations) can be proved in TO. although the truth not only
of 3xB(x) but also of 3xD(x) and 3xl(x) (under the given interpretation of T)
was, of course, indubitable for Aquinas.
In the ontological doctrines here under consideration, Aquinas does not
consider so-called abstract objects, numbers, for example, or geometrical
figures (which entities one might think of subsuming under category I(x));
hence they are not included in the universe of discourse. There is also a more
substantial justification for their exclusion:
20. corpus malhematicum non est per se existens, ut Philosophus probat
(Summa contra gentiles, 1, 20).
Clearly, ‘corpora mathematica’ -  and certainly all abstract ‘objects’ -  are not
objects in the full sense (of substance or quasi-substance) for Aquinas.
Further on in this essay, extensions of TO will be presented in which
3xl(x) and 3xD(x) are provable. But TO itself is very weak in its existential
assumptions; not even the entirely unproblematic assertion 3xM(x) can be de­
duced in it. However. TO, while entailing no further existential commitment
than that there is at least one object, entails (under the intended interpretation
of T) that there are no material uncreated (uncaused) objects. Here TO is
following Aquinas perfectly.
The second part of the proof of T13 can be rephrased in the following
manner: By B4(d) and A l: Vx(->s(x) +  f(x) =  c(x)) [1]; hence Vx(w(x) =
s(x) D -nw(x) +  f(x) =  c(x)) [2]; by B7, Dl : Vx(->m(x) =  c(x) D w(x) +  f(x) =
c(x)) [3]; hence Vx(->m(x) =  c(x) D --w(x) =  s(x)) [4], and hence Vx(w(x) =
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s(x) D m(x) =  c(x)) [5]. In this way, it becomes easier to bring out the intuitive
ideas behind the proof: The pure form (as well as the essence) of an object
enters into composition with the being of the object [1]: here one may cite
21. esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae (Summa theologiae, 1, 3, 4).
Hence, if the essence of an object is identical with the being of the object,
then its pure form enters into composition with its essence [2]. But the pure
form of a material object does not enter into composition with its essence [3];
there is nothing in a material object that is constituted by its essence and its
pure form. Hence the essence of a material object is different from its being
[4], and therefore an object whose essence is its being is immaterial [5].
IX
Using D5. TH, and T10, theorems about divine objects can be deduced that
correspond to Thomas’s dicta about God:
T16 (a)Vx(D(x) D ~'M(x)) — 22. Deus non est corpus (Summa contra gentiles. 1,20).
(b) Vx(D(x) D w(x) =  s(x)) -  23. in Deo non est aliud essentia vel quidditas
quam suum esse (Summa contra gentiles, 1, 22).
(c) Vx(D(x) D  X =  w(x)) — 24. Deus est sua essentia (Summa contra gentiles,
1,21).
(d) Vx(D(x) D X =  s(x)) — 25. Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est.
sed etiam suum esse (Summa theologiae, 1, 3, 4).
By T13 and T9 we obtain
T17 Vx(M(x) D ->x =  w(x)).
And Aquinas says accordingly:
26. in rebus composais ex materia et forma, necesse est quod différant natura
vel essentia et suppositum [seu res] (Summa theologiae. 1. 3. 3).
Proceeding in the reverse order of formal theorem and exegetical justification,
we first find Aquinas saying the following:
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27. Si autem sint aliquae formae creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se
subsistentes, ut quidam de angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum
quid, inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahuntur per
aliquam materiam: sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse, et non est
suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum et contractum ad
determinatam naturam (Summa theologiae, 1, 7, 2).
And in accordance with this quotation we then have:
T18 (a) Vx(I(x) D x  =  a(x)) (by D6, D3, and T l)
(b) Vx(I(x) D -x  =  s(x)) (by D6. D4. and T12)
(c) Vx(I(x) D x =  s(x) +  f(x)) (by T 18(a), D2, Al)
All of this amply shows that the theorems and definitions of TO mirror Thom-
asic doctrine.
In Summa theologiae, 1, 3, 3, Aquinas deduces (in his own words, of
course) T16(c) from the invalid sentence Vx(m(x) =  c(x) D x — f(x)) -  ‘Ev­
ery immaterial object is its pure form’ (S) (which I already had occasion to
remark upon). He does so with the help of the principles Vx(m(x) =  c(x) D
w(x) =  f(x)) (T3) and Vx(D(x) D m(x) =  c(x)) (T 16(a)). From S and (im ­
plicit) T3. he first gets the (invalid) sentence Vx(m(x) =  c(x) D x =  w(x)) -
see quotation 11; and then, in immediate continuation of quotation 11, he
writes:
28. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex materia et forma, ut ostensum est
[T16(a)], oportet quod Deus sit sua deitas [id est, sua essentia], sua vita, et
quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.
Thus, starting from an invalid premise, Thomas obtains a (Thomasically)
valid conclusion. The partly invalid premises made use of in Summa the­
ologiae, I, 3, 3, to obtain Vx(D(x) D x =  w(x)) can also be used to ob­
tain Vx(D(x) D x  =  f(x)): the latter is an immediate consequence of S and
T16(a). That sentence ( ‘Every divine object is its pure form'), too, is valid
in spite of the invalid premise from which it is derived; it is just as valid as
Vx(D(x) D x =  a(x)) ( ‘Every divine object is its actuating form’), which one
gets from T 16(a) by T l . The Thomasic validity of the two sentences emerges
from the following quotation:
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29. unumquodque agens agit per suam formam: unde secundum quod aliquid
se habet ad suam formam. sic se habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur
primum est et per se agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. Deus autem
est primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est igitur
per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma (Summa
theologiae, 1, 3, 2).
In this quotation, Aquinas certainly did not intend to refer to pure form rather
than to actuating form, or vice versa, since he did not distinguish between
them. Indeed, with respect to divine objects, Aquinas is quite right in this
non-distinction (but not with respect to all objects); for the actuating form
and the pure form of a divine object are provably identical (see T19 below).
Thus, quotation 29 can be taken to provide Thomasic evidence for Vx(D(x) D
x = f(x)) as well as for Vx(D(x) D x =  a(x)), since these sentences are provably
equivalent (on the basis of T19). (And therefore, since Vx(D(x) D x  =  a(x))
is provable, as has already been shown, Vx(D(x) D x =  f(x)) is also provable
-  without using any invalid premise.) We have:
T19 Vx(D(x) D a(x) =  f(x))
Proof -. Assume D(x), hence by D5: -^M(x) A ->C(x); hence by D3 and D4:
m(x) =  c(x) A w(x) =  s(x); hence by DI: m(x) =  c(x) A f(x) +  m(x) =  s(x);
hence f(x) +  c(x) =  s(x); hence by A2(b): f(x) =  s(x); hence f(x) + s(x) =  f(x)
+ f(x); hence by D2 and A2(a): a(x) =  f(x).
We can also prove the converse of T19:
T20 Vx(a(x) =  f(x) D D(x))
(If the actuating form  o f an object is its pure form, then the object is
divine)
Proof-. Assume a(x) =  f(x); hence by D2: f(x) + s(x) =  f(x); hence by A3:
s(x) =  f(x) V s(x) =  c(x); hence by B4(c): s(x) =  f(x); by B 1 : x =  (f(x) + m(x))
+ s(x); hence by B2: x =  (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x); hence x =  (f(x) + f(x)) + m(x);
hence by A2(a): x =  f(x) + m(x); hence by DI: x =  w(x); hence by T9: w(x)
=  s(x); hence by D4: - ’C(x); hence by T15: D(x).
T19 and T20 make precise what is meant by The pure form of an object
is normally distinct from its actuating form’ (cf. section III, the paragraph
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before quotation 2). The pure form of an object is distinct from its actuating
form if and only if that object is not a divine object -  which, certainly, is
normally the case.
There are many equivalence statements regarding the predicate D(x) that
are provable in TO (beside the equivalence theorem T15 and the trivial defi­
nitional equivalences):
T21 (a) Vx(D(x) =  a(x) =  f(x)) (by T 19, T20)
(b) Vx(D(x) =  x =  w(x)) (by T15, D4. T9. T10)
(c) Vx(D(x) =  x =  s(x)) (byT15, D4.T11,T12)
(d) Vx(D(x) =  s(x) =  f(x))
Proof : From a(x) =  f(x): s(x) =  f(x) (see the proof of T20); from s(x) =  f(x):
a(x) =  f(x) (see the proof of T19); hence by T21(a): T21(d) (what was to be
proven).
(e) Vx(D(x) =  x =  f(x))
Proof: From D(x): x =  s(x) As(x) =  f(x), by T21(c) and T21(d); hence
x =  f(x); from x =  f(x): x =  s(x), by T7; hence by T21(c): D(x).
(f) Vx(D(x) =  s(x) =  a(x))
Proof: From D(x): a(x) =  f(x)As(x) =  f(x), by T21(a) and T21(d); hence
s(x) =  a(x); from s(x) =  a(x): s(x) =  f(x) + s(x), by D2; hence by Al: s(x) +
f(x) =  s(x); hence by A3: f(x) =  s(x) V f(x) =  c(x); hence by B4(b): f(x) =
s(x); hence by T21(d): D(x).
(g) Vx(D(x) =  w(x) =  a(x))
Proof : From D(x): x =  f(x) Ax =  w(x) Aa(x) =  f(x), by T21(e), T21(b), and
T21(a); hence w(x) =  a(x); from w(x) =  a(x): f(x) + m(x) =  f(x) + s(x), by
DI and D2; hence by Bl: x =  (f(x) + s(x)) + s(x); hence by B4(a): - i(f(x) 4-
s(x)) +  s(x) =  c(x); hence by B8: f(x) =  s(x); hence by T21(d): D(x).
We have a much shorter sequence of in TO provable equivalence statements
regarding the predicate -^M(x):
T22 (a) Vx(—M(x) =  x =  a(x)) (by T l, T2, D3)
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(b) Vx(-M(x) =  w(x) =  f(x)) (by T3, T4, D3)
It is interesting to compare T22(a) with T21(e), and T22(b) with T21(g), and
the two pairs with each other. In the pair T22(b) and T21(g) the role of ‘f(x)’
and 'a(x)’ is inverse to the role of ‘f(x)’ and ‘a(x)’ in the pair T22(a), T21(e).
From T21 and T22 together, the radical simplicity of a divine object can
be deduced. An object is said to be radically simple if and only if every
(fundamental) aspect of it (for brevity’s sake: aspect =  fundamental aspect)
that is different from its empty aspect is identical with the object itself, or
in other words: if it has no proper (fundamental) components. The decisive
theorem is this:
T23 Vx(D(x) D x  =  f(x) Ax — w(x)Ax =  s(x) Ax =  a(x))
(A divine object is radically simple)
Proof : Assume D(x); hence -iM(x), by D5; hence x =  f(x) Ax =  w(x) Ax =
s(x) Ax =  a(x), in part by T21(e), (b), (c) from D(x), and in part by T22(a)
from ->M(x).
It can easily be seen that the converse of T23 is also provable. The reading
given to T23 (see the sentence in italics below it) can be justified as follows:
Suppose x is a divine object: D(x), and 0[x] is an aspect of x that is different
from c(x); hence 0[x] is different from m(x) (since m(x) =  c(x) because of
-iM(x) -  which follows from D(x)). Then by T28 -  proven below -  <b x  is
identical to x, or f(x), or w(x), or s(x), or a(x). In each of these cases, ^[x] is
identical to x (making use of T23 for the four cases other than the first case).
Therefore: Every aspect of x 14 that is different from c(x) is identical with x,
that is: x is radically simple.
14Note that every aspect of x  is designated by some AE of T around “x”. There are no
(fundamental) aspects of x that are not designated by some AE of T around “x”. This follows
from the intended interpretation of T.
T23 corresponds to the Thomasic doctrine of the total simplicity of God:
30. quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse manifestum.
Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit compositio, neque
quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; neque compositio formae et
materiae: neque in eo sit aliud natura et suppositum; neque aliud essentia
et esse [...] manifestum est quod Deus nulle modo compositus est, sed est
omnino simplex. [...] Unde, cum Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse,
nullo modo compositus esse potest (Summa theologiae, 1, 3, 7).
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The degree of composition of an object is the number of its proper compo­
nents, that is: the number of its (fundamental) aspects that are different from
its empty aspect and different from the object itself. The degree of composi­
tion of a divine object is, evidently, zero.
An object is said to be radically composite if its degree of composition is
maximal. Material objects (that is, created bodies, according to T14) are rad­
ically composite, as we shall see. We first prove the following two theorems:
T24 Vx->x =  m(x)
(No object is its matter)
Proof-. Assume x =  m(x); by Bl: x =  (f(x) + m(x)) + s(x); hence by B2: x
=  (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x); hence m(x) =  (f(x) + s(x)) + m(x); hence by Al: m(x)
+ (f(x) + s(x)) =  m(x): hence by A3: f(x) +  s(x) =  m(x) V f(x) +  s(x) =  c(x) -
which contradicts the conjunction of B3(c) and B4(d).
Aquinas says:
31. Esse autem non dicitur de materia, sed de toto; unde materia non potest
dici quod est. sed ipsa substantia [lota res] est id quod est (Summa contra
gentiles, 2, 54).15
15The phrase “[id] quod est" can be taken to designate the entire object, i.e.. the (individ­
ual) substance or quasi-substance; this is how the phrase is to be understood in quotation 31.
It can also be taken to designate merely the essence (the “substantia", in another sense) of the
object; this is how it is to be understood in quotation 6. The phrase “[id] quo est", in contrast,
can be taken to designate the being (“esse”) of the object; this is how it is to be understood in
quotation 6. It can also be taken to designate the actuating form  of the object ; this is perhaps
how “id quo aliquid actu est” should be understood in quotation 33 -  if “id quo aliquid actu
est" has not been put erroneously for “id quod aliquid actu est”, i.e., for “essentia”; that such
a slip occurred seems not unlikely, given the context: Thomas is certainly speaking, in the
greater pan of quotation 33. about the essences of objects, justifying that an object’s essence
is not its matter. And note: the determination of species that the actuating form of an object
provides is not perfect (see T55. T57. and T58 in section XXII), whereas the determination
of species that is provided by the essence of an object is perfect (see T56).
T25 Vx->w(x) =  m(x)
(The essence of no object is its matter)
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P ro o f '. Assume w(x) =  m(x); hence by D 1 : f(x) + m(x) — m(x); hence by A 1 :m(x) + f(x) =  m(x); hence by A3: f(x) =  m(x) V f(x) =  c(x), which contradictsthe conjunction o f B3(a) and B4(b).And Aquinas says:
32. materia non est ipsa substantia rei, nam sequeretur omnes formas esse ac­
cidentia. sicut antiqui Naturales opinabantur: sed materia est pars substantiae
(Summa contra gentiles, 2, 54).
33. Quod enim materia sola rei non sit essentia, planum est, quia res per
essentiam suam cognoscibilis est, et in specie ordinatur vel in genere; sed
materia neque cognitionis principium [est], neque secundum earn aliquid ad
genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quo [quod?] aliquid actu
est (De ente et essentia, 2. 5).
We then have:
T26 (a) Vx(M(x) D  -ix  =  m(x) A  ->x =  f(x) A  ->x =  w(x) A ->x =  s(x) A ->x =  a(x))(b) Vx(M(x) D  - |m(x) =  f(x) A ->m(x) =  w(x) A  -■m(x) =  s(x) A ->m(x) =a(x) A ~>f(x) =  w(x) A —>f(x) =  s(x) A —>f(x) =  a(x) A-iw(x) =  s(x) A ~'W(x) =a(x) A ->s(x) =  a(x))(c) Vx(M(x) D -'C(x) =  m(x) A ->c(x) =  f(x) A ->c(x) =  w(x) A ->c(x) =  s(x) A->c(x) =  a(x))
P r o o f ', (a) Assume M (x); by T24: ->x =  m(x); and. because o f M (x), by B5.D3: ->x =  f(x); and by T21(b), T16(a): ->x =  w(x); and by T21(c), T16(a):->x =  s(x); and by T2, D3: - a  =  a(x).(b) Assume M(x); by B3(a): ->m(x) =  f(x); by T25: ->m(x) =  w(x); byB3(b): - ’m(x) =  s(x); by B3(c), D2: -■m(x) =  a(x); and. because o f M (x), byT4, D3: ->f(x) =  w(x); and by T21(d), T16(a): ->f(x) =  s(x); and by T21(a),T16(a): ->f(x) =  a(x); and by T15, T16(a), D4: -iw(x) =  s(x); and by T21(g),T  16(a): ->w(x) =  a(x); and by T 2 1 (f), T16(a): ->s(x) =  a(x).(c) Assume M(x); hence by D3: ->c(x) =  m(x); the other non-identities inthe consequent o f T26(c) follow by B4 alone.It is seen from T26 that a material object has at least five proper components(that is: aspects that are different from the object’s empty aspect and fromthe objects itself). And there cannot be more than five proper components in
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an object (see T28). Hence the degree of composition of a material object is
maximal, and it is radically composite.
The intelligences, in turn, are neither radically simple nor radically com­
posite. While the degree of composition of divine objects is zero, and that
of material objects five, the degree of composition of created immaterial sub­
stances and quasi-substances is two-.
T27 (a) Vx(I(x) D ->x =  m(x) A - x  — f(x) A -x  =  w(x) A - x  =  s(x) A x =  a(x))
(b) Vx(I(x) D f(x) =  w(x) A ->f(x) =  s(x))
(c) Vx(I(x) D c(x) =  m(x) A ~>c(x) =  f(x) A ->c(x) =  w(x) A ->c(x) =  s(x) A
-c(x) =  a(x))
Proof -, (a) Assume I(x); hence by D6: - ’M(x)AC(x); hence by T15, T21(e):
-x  =  f(x); and by T15, T21(b): ->x =  w(x); hence by T18(b): -<x = s(x); and
by T18(a): x =  a(x).
(b) Assume I(x); hence by D6: ->M(x) AC(x); and hence by T3. D3: f(x)
=  w(x); and by T15, T21(d): ->f(x) =  s(x).
(c) Assume I(x); hence by D6, D3: c(x) =  m(x); the non-identities in the
consequent of T27(c) follow by B4 alone.
In view of T27, f(x), w(x), and s(x) are proper components of x -  assuming
I(x); and they are the only proper components of x (in view of T28; if ö x
is m(x), then it is not a proper component of x, since m(x) =  c(x); if 0[x] is
a(x), then it is not a proper component of x, since a(x) =  x). Of the aspects
f(x), w(x), and s(x), only two are distinct (by T27(b)). Thus, the degree of
composition of x is two.
Occasionally Aquinas calls intelligences as well as God ‘substantiae sim-
plices' (see quotation 1). However, in doing so, he has in mind an extended
sense of ‘simplex’ {not radical simplicity):
34. Non est autem opinandum quod, quamvis substantiae intellectuales non
sint corporeae. nec ex materia et forma compositae, nec in materia existentes
sicut formae materiales, quod propter hoc divinae simplicitati adaequentur
(Summa contra gentiles, 2,52; consider, in this connection, quotations 12 and
13).
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X
This section contains the formulation and the proof of the Reduction Theorem
(for TO), and the formulations and the proofs of some corollaries of that
theorem.
Definition: An AE a  of T is in TO reducible to the EDs ß \ , ..., ßu
of T if and only if a = ß\ V... V a  — ßn is provable in TO.
Reduction Theorem: If t is an OD of T and 0 t] is an AE of T,
then 0[t] is reducible in TO to t, f(t), m(t), s(t), f(t) + m(t), f(t) +
s(t), c(t), or in short: to RS[t].
Proof :
Let t be an OD of T; there are four PAEs of T around t: f(t), m(t), s(t), and
c(t); with these 16 SAEs of T around t can be formed, and 128 TAEs of T
around t; there are no other AEs of T around t.
Because of Al, 6 of the 16 SAEs of T around t are reducible in TO to
their respective commutation (for example, f(t) + m(t) is the commutation of
m(t) + f(t), and vice versa): hence every SAE of T around t is reducible in TO
to RS[t] if the remaining 10 SAEs around t are reducible in TO to RS[t]; let
the remaining 10 be these:
(i) c(t) + c(t), m(t) + m(t), f(t) + f(t), s(t) + s(t);
(ii) m(t) + c(t), f(t) + c(t), s(t) + c(t);
(iii) m(t) + s(t);
(iv) f(t) + s(t), f(t) + m(t).
Because of A2(a), each AE in row (i) is reducible in TO to a PAE of T around
t, and therefore to RS[t].
Because of A2(b), each AE in row (ii) is reducible in TO to a PAE of T
around t, and therefore to RS[t].
Because of B6, Al, A2(b), the AE in row (iii) is reducible in TO to c(t),
s(t), and therefore to RS[t],
Every AE in row (iv) is trivially reducible in TO to RS[t].
We have now established
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Lemma 1: Every SAE o f  T around t is reducible in TO to RS[t].
Because of A l, 64 of the TAEs of T around t are reducible in TO to their
respective commutation -  for example, in such a manner that, in each case,
the relevant commutation has the form (0[t + 0'it]) + 0 / , [t]; hence every TAE
of T around t is reducible in TO to RS[t] i f  the remaining 64 TAEs around t
are reducible in TO to RS[t].
For these remaining TAEs. each having the form (0 [t] + 0',t]) + 0 w[t], we
obtain:
(z) If (0 [t] + 0 ' t]) is ot(t) + a(t) , then the TAE is reducible in TO to a
SAE of T around t by A2(a), and therefore to RS[t] by Lemma 1.
(zz) If (0[f + 0'[t]) is a ( t)  +  c(t) or c(t) +  a (t) , then the TAE is reducible
in TO to a SAE of T around t by A2(b) and Al. and therefore to RS[t] by
Lemma 1.
(zzz) If (0 [t] + 0'[t]) is f(t) + m(t) or m(t) + f(t);
then, if 0"[t]) is s(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to t by Bl and A l, and
therefore to RS[t];
then, if 0 " [t]) is c(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to f(t) + m(t) by A2(b) and
Al, and therefore to RS[tJ;
then, if 0"[t]) is f(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to c(t), f(t) by B7, Al and
A2,16 and therefore to RS[t];
l 6 One needs both A2(a) and A2(b).
1 'This is perhaps not so easily seen. There are two cases: m(t) =  c(t) and —>m(t) =  c(t).
In the second case, m(t) + s(t) =  c(t) by B6; and therefore: s(t) + m(t) =  c(t) by A l; hence
(m(t) + s(t)) + s(t) =  s(t) and (s(t) + m(t)) + s(t) =  s(t) by Al and A2(b). In the first case.
m(t) + s(t) =  s(t) by Al and A2(b); and s(t) + m(t) =  s(t) by A2(b); hence (m(t) + s(t)) + s(t)
=  s(t) and (s(t) + m(t)) + s(t) =  s(t) by A2(a).
then, if 0"[t]) is m(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to c(t), f(t) by B7, Al and
A2(b), and therefore to RS[t].
(zv) If (0 [t] + 0'[t]) is m(t) + s(t) or s(t) + m(t);
then, if 0"[t]) is s(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to s(t) by B6. A l and A2,17
and therefore to RS[t];
then, if 0" [t]) is c(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to a SAE of T around t by
A2(b), and therefore to RS[t] by Lemma 1;
then, if 0"[t]) is f(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to f(t), f(t) + s(t) by B6.
A2(b), A l. and therefore to RS[t];
then, if 0" [t]) is m(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to m(t), s(t) by B6, A2(b),
A l, and therefore to RS[t],
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(v) If (0 [t] + 0'[t]) is f(t) + s(t) or s(t) + f(t);
then, if 0"[t]) is s(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to c(t), f(t) by B8, A2(a),
A l, and therefore to RS[t];
then, if 0"[t]) is c(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to f(t) + s(t) by A2(b) and
A l. and therefore to RS[t];
then, if 0".t]) is f(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to c(t), f(t) by B8. A2(a), A l,
and therefore to RS[t];
then, if 0" [t]) is m(t), the TAE is reducible in TO to t by B2, B l. A l, and
therefore to RS[t].
We have now established
Lemma 2: Every TAE of T around t is reducible in TO to RS[t].
Since every PAE of T around t is trivially reducible in TO to RS[t], and since
every AE of T around t is either a PAE or a SAE or a TAE around t, we
obtain by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2: Every AE o f T around t is reducible in TO
to RS[t]. This result establishes the Reduction Theorem.
The Reduction Theorem entails (making use of DI and D2) the following
theorem (in which 0[x] is any AE of T around “x”):
T28 Vx(0 [x] =  x V 0 [x] =  f(x) V 0 [x] =  m(x) V 0 [x] =  s(x) V 0 [x] =  w(x) V
0[x] =a(x)V 0[x] =c(x))
T28 is logically equivalent to Vx(->0rLx] =  xA-^0[x] =  c(x) D (p\x\ =  f(x)V
0[x] =  m(x) V 0[x] =  s(x) V (j)[x] = w(x) V0[x] =  a(x)), which says (straight­
forwardly) that there are at most five proper components in an object, namely,
f(x), m(x), s(x), w(x), and a(x).
A PSL of T is called ‘undecided in TO’ if and only if neither the PSL itself
nor its negation is provable in TO. It can easily be shown that of the PSLs of
T which can be formed by using only the material listed in RS[t] (that is: t,
f(t), m(t), s(t), f(t) + m(t), f(t) + s(t), c(t); cf. the Reduction Theorem) at most
(and very probably exactly) the following eleven PSLs are undecided in TO
(and. of course. PSLs that are equivalent to them by Al and/or the symmetry
of identity): m(t) =  c(t), f(t) =  t, f(t) =  s(t), f(t) =  f(t) + m(t), f(t) =  f(t) +
s(t), s(t) =  t, s(t) =  f(t) + m(t), s(t) =  f(t) + s(t), f(t) + s(t) =  t, f(t) + m(t) =
t, f(t) + s(t) =  f(t) + m(t). Based on the proven theorems of TO. these PSLs
can be grouped in two equivalence-lists:
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Divinity Immateriality
| f(t) =  t
s(t) =  t
f(t) =  S(t) m(t) =  c(t)
f(t) + m(t) =  t f(t) + s(t) =  t
f(t) =  f(t) + s(t) f(t) =  f(t) + m(t)
s(t) =  f(t) + m(t)
s(t) =  f(t) + s(t)
f(t) + s(t) =  f(t) + m(t)
Every SL in the left list implies every SL in the right list.
Let t be an OD of T and 0[t] =  0'[t a PSL of T (and note that pT  and/or
0'[t] can be the same expression as t). It can be shown:
T29 0[t] =  0'[t] =
0[t] =  r[t]AP'[r] = /[ ! ]  Ar[t] = r / [t]V
0 [t] =  r[t] A 0'[t] =  k'[t] A r[t] =  k'[t] V
</>[t] =  k[t] A 0'[t] =  /[t] A k[t] =  r'ft] V
</>[t] =  kft] A0'[t] =  k'[t] A k[t] =  k'[t],
where r[t], k[t], r'ft], k'[t] belong to RS[t]; r[t], k[t] are the ultimate
reducts of 0[t], and /[t], k '[t are the ultimate reducts of 0'ft]: possibly,
some or all expressions out of r[t], k[t]. /[t], k'[t are identical.18
Proof : The part of the proof that concerns the direction from the right side of
the equivalence to its left side is trivial. Assume 0 [t] =  0 '[t] ; in consideration
of the proof of the Reduction Theorem (see footnote 18) we have: (0[t] =
r[t] V0[t] =  k[t]) A (</>'[t] =  r'ft] V</>'[t] =  k'[tj), and hence: 0[t] = r[ t]A 0 , [t] =
r 'ß V ^ t ]  =  r[t] A0'[t] =k'[t]V 0[t] =  k[t] A0'[t] = r'[t]V 0[t] =k[t]A 0 '[t] =
k' [t]; hence the right side of the equivalence follows because of p l  =  0 z[t].
l s From the proof of the Reduction Theorem it is seen that an AE 0[t] of T around the OD t
has at most two alternative ultimate reducts (expressions in RS[t]): r[t] and k[t]. In case p[t]
has just one ultimate reduct, the expressions r[t] and k[t] are identical. In case p[t] belongs
to RS[t]. the ultimate reduct of 0 [t] is 0[t]. In case p[t] is the OD t itself, the ultimate reduct
of p[t] is t.
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For obvious reasons T29 may be called the Normal Form Theorem (for TO).
Here is an example of its application:
m(x) +  s(x) =  m(x) =
m(x) +  s(x) =  c(x) A m(x) =  m(x) A c(x) =  m(x) V
m(x) 4- s(x) =  c(x) A m(x) =  m(x) A c(x) =  m(x) V
m(x) +  s(x) =  s(x) A m(x) =  m(x) A s(x) =  m(x) V
m(x) +  s(x) =  s(x) A m(x) =  m(x) A s(x) =  m(x),19 hence
19According to the proof of the Reduction Theorem, *m(x) + s(x)’ has two alternative
ultimate reducts: *c(x)’ and *s(x)’.
m(x) +  s(x) =  m(x) =
m(x) +  s(x) =  c(x) A c(x) =  m(x) V m(x) +  s(x) =  s(x) A s(x) =  m(x), i.e.,
m(x) +  s(x) =  m(x) =
m(x) +  s(x) =  c(x) Ac(x) =  m(x) (by B3(b)), hence by A l, A2(b). B4(c):
->m(x) 4- s(x) =  m(x).
XI
I now proceed to the proof of the consistency of TO. The consistency of
TO will be proved by providing a verifying model for it in an interpreted
semiformal language T' that contains T as a sublanguage.
The ODs of T (OVs and ONs of T) are the second-order ODs of T';
they speak about (that is, are used for quantifying over or for referring to)
the circles in a Euclidean plane (normal circles, with finite positive radius),
which are identified with certain sets of points in that plane. (The points
inside a circle belong to the circle.) The first-order ODs of T', in contrast,
speak about the points in the plane. In addition, there are designators for
miscellaneous sets of points in the plane (as needed), and designators for real
numbers (variables, names, functional expressions). While the second-order
OVs of T7 are x, x7, x77, etc., the first-order OVs of T7 are y, yJ , y", etc.
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In a circle x, conceived as a set of points, there can be distinguished cer­
tain proper subsets, for example, the set to which belongs only the center of
x, the set of all points in the periphery of x, the set of all points which lie
(properly) between the center and the periphery of x. I define:
Firstly, for all second-order ODs t of T':
(a) m(t) := À20y(y =  the center of t);21
(b) f(t) := ky(y lies [properly] between the center of t and the periphery of
t);22
(c) s(t) := Ây(y is in the periphery of t);23
(d) c(t) := the empty set [Ây'(y' 7̂  / ) ] .
2O‘A’ is here employed as the operator of class-abstraction.
21The center of t is the point of t whose distance from any two points of t that have distance
d(t) from each other is d(l)/2, where d(t) is the furthest distance between points of t (in other
words, the length of the diameter of t).
22y lies between the center of t and the periphery of t iff 3 /  ly' is in the periphery of
t, and y  is on the straight line between the center of t and ÿ .  but neither identical to /  nor
identical to the center of t).
23y is in the periphery of t iff y  € t and B /fy ' G t and the distance between y and y' is
d(t)). (Concerning d(t), see footnote 21.)
Secondly, more generally for all designators a  and ß of T' that refer to sets
of points in the (intended) plane:
(e) a  is connected with ß := ~^a = ß A 3y3y'(y e  a  and /  G ß and yJ can
be reached from y without touching a point that belongs neither to a
nor to ß ) V - a  = ß A (a  =  A y V  /  / )  V ß =  kyJ (y'
(f) a  + ß := ky ((a  is connected with ß A a  and ß have no element in
common Va =  ß)A (y G aV y € ß)).
With the help of these definitions, the axioms of TO can be proven on the
basis of certain elementary geometrical facts about circles, employing ele­
mentary set theory in a two-sorted predicate-logical framework (it should be
noted that the only sets referred to are sets of individuals, i.e., sets of geomet­
rical points):
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Proof o f Al:
‘0[v] is connected with </>'[vp is provably equivalent (on the basis of the
geometrical background theory and definition (e)) to y 'v ]  is connected with
0 u]’. Hence, obviously, ‘(0 y  is connected with (f>'y\ A0 v] and0 'y  have
no element in common V Qy] = 0 7[v]) A (y G 0[v] Vy G 0'[v])’ is provably
equivalent to ‘(0'[v] is connected with 0[u] A(j)'\y] and (f)[y] have no element
in common V 0'[u] = 0[v]) A(y G 0'[v]Vy G 0[u])’. Hence by the principles
of elementary set theory and definition (f): 0 u] + <J)'\y' = 0 7’v] +  0 [v].
Proof o f A2(a):
‘(0 [v] is connected with 0 [v] A 0 [v] and 0[u] have no element in common V
0[u] =  0[v]) A(y G 0[u] Vy G 0[v])’ is provably equivalent to ‘y G 0[v]’ (on
purely logical grounds). Hence by the principles of set theory and definition
(f): 0[v] +  0[u] =
Proof o f A2(b):
(i) Assume: (0[u] is connected with c(u) A0[u; and c(u) have no ele­
ment in common V 0 tv ]=  c(u)) A(y G (j)[v] Vy G c(u)), hence by definition
(d): y G 0[v] Vy G Ay7 (y7 /  y7), and hence because of ->y G Ay7(y7 7̂  y7):
y e  0[v].
(ii) Assume y G 0[v]; hence y G 0[u] Vy G c(u); c(u) =  Ay7(y7 /  y7)
by definition (d); hence ->Q\y\ =  c(u) A (0'u] =  Ay7( /  /  y7) Vc(v) =
Ay7(y7 f=- y7)); hence by definition (e): <j)[v] is connected with c(v). More­
over, 0 [u] and c(v) have no element in common, since c(u) =  Ay7(y7 /  y7).
Hence: (</>it/ is connected with c(u) A0[ui and c(v) have no element in
common V 0[u] =  c(u)) A(y G </>[v] Vy G c(u)).
From (i) and (ii) (that together demonstrate the co-extensionality of the
relevant set-defining predicates) one obtains by the principles of set theory
and definition (f): (f>[v] + c (v ) =  0[v].
Proof o f A3:
Assume 0[v] +  0% ] =  <p[v] (the first assumption)', assume - | 0 / [v] =  c(u)
(the second assumption)-, what must be deduced from these two assumptions
is <t>'\y] = 0 [v] (in order to obtain a proof of A3).
I first demonstrate (i): 3y(y G 0 [v] ), and I then demonstrate (ii): 3y(y G
0[u]) D ^ 7iv] =  ^[u]; from (i) and (ii), Q'y] =  ^[v] follows by modus po-
nens.
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(i) Assume ->3y(y G 0[v]); hence 0[u] =  Äy, (y/ / / ) ;  because of —></>'[v] =
c(v) (the second assumption), we have by definition (d): 3y(y G 0'[v]), and
therefore: y G 0;u +  0'[1Z by definition (f), since (y G 0 u] Vy G 0 ' [u]) A
0 1): is connected with 0'[u] A 0 |u  and 0'[v] have no element in common
[by y G 0'[1>], 0 [1>] =  À.y'Çy' y'), 0'ft)] /  ^y '(y ' /  /)>  and definition (e)];
hence —>0 [ u * 1 +  0'[u] = (f)[v] -  contradicting the first assumption.
is connected with 0 ' v  A0[v] and 0'[1) have no element in common: be­
cause of —>0' u] =  c(u) (the second assumption), we have by definition (d):
3y"(y" G 0'1)]), and therefore: y" G 0[v] +  0'[v] by definition (f), since (y" G
0[u] Vy" G 0'[ui) A0 juj is connected with 0'[vj A0[v] and 0';t)] have no el­
ement in common (cf. the first disjunct): but -y "  G 0[v], since 0 u 1 and 0'[1)]
have no element in common and y" G 0 '[v : hence: ->0 [v] +  0 ' [v] =  0[v] -
contradicting the first assumption. Consequently (the first disjunct having
been excluded), we have the second disjunct of the underlined disjunction:
0'1) =  0 ' 1)]. i.e.. 0'[u] =  0[t)]. It has now been shown: 3y(y G 0[u]) D
0'[u] =  0[v].
Proof o f  B 1 :
Bl is established on the basis of the principles of set theory if the relevant
predicates (those underlined below) are shown to be co-extensional. This is
done in the following way:
(i) Assume y G x; hence [since x is a circle and using definitions (a), (b),
(c)]: y G m(x) Vy G f(x) Vy G s(x).
In the first and second case [belonging to the disjunction just deduced],
y G f(x) — m(x) by definition (f) [and the principles of set theory, of course],
since in those two cases [in consideration of (a), (b), and (e)]: (y G f(x) Vy G
m(x)) A f(x) is connected with m(x) A f(x) and m(x) have no element in com­
mon. Hence y G (f(x) -I- m(x)) 4- s(x) by (f), since (y G f(x) -I- m(x) V y G
s(x)) A f(x) +  m(x) is connected with s(x) A f(x) +  m(x) and s(x) have no el­
ement in common [in consideration of (f), as applied to f(x) + m(x), (c). and
(e), always remembering that x is a circle].
In the third case [belonging to the above disjunction, the disjunction first
deduced], y G (f(x) +  m(x)) +  s(x) by (f), since (y G f(x) +  m(x) Vy G s(x)) A
(ii) Assume y G 0[u], hence y G 0[v] +  0'[v] (since 0[v] +  0'[i)i =  0[v],
according to the first assumption), hence by definition (f) (and set theory):
0[v] is connected with 0 ' [v] A0fu] and 0'[u] have no element in common
V 0[u] =  0'[i)]: of the underlined disjunction, assume the first disjunct'. 0[1)]
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f(x) +  m(x) is connected with s(x) A f(x) 4- m(x) and s(x) have no element incommon [the justification has already been noted; the only difference is thatthe part y G f(x) +  m(x) V y  G s(x) is now deduced from y e  s(x), and not from
y  e f(x ) +  m(x)].(ii) Assume y e  (f(x) 4- m(x)) 4- s(x); hence by (f): y  G f(x) 4- m(x) V y Gs(x), hence by (f): y e  f(x) V y  G m(x) V y  G s(x); hence, since x  is a circle, by(a), (b), (c): y G x .
Proof o f  B2:(i) Assume y € (f(x) +  m(x)) +  s(x); hence by definition (f): y G f(x) 4-m(x) V y  G s(x); hence by (f): y G f(x) V y G m(x) V y  G s(x).
In the first and third case [belonging to the disjunction just deduced], y Gf(x) 4- s(x) by (f), since (y G f(x) V y G s(x)) A f(x) is connected with s(x) A f(x)and s(x) have no element in common [in consideration of (b), (c), and (e),remembering that x  is a circle]; hence y G (f(x) 4-s(x)) 4-m(x) by (f), since(y G f(x) +  s(x) V y G m(x)) A f(x) 4- s(x) is connected with m(x) A f(x) 4- s(x)and m(x) have no element in common [in consideration of (f), as applied tof(x) +  s(x), (a), and (e), always remembering that x is a circle].
In the second case [belonging to the above disjunction, the disjunctionfirst deduced], y G (f(x) +  s(x)) +  m(x) by (f), since (y G f(x) +  s(x) Vy G m(x))A f(x) 4- s(x) is connected with m(x) A f(x) 4- s(x) and m(x) have no element incommon [the justification has already been noted; the only difference is thatthe part y G f(x) 4- s(x) Vy G m(x) is now deduced from y G m(x), and not fromy G f(x) +  s(x)].(ii) Assume y G (f(x) 4- s(x)) 4- m(x); hence by (f): y G f(x) V y  G s(x) V y Gm(x).
In the first and third case [i.e., y G f(x), y G m(x)], y G f(x) 4- m(x) by(f), since (y G f(x) V y G m(x)) A f(x) is connected with m(x) A f(x) and m(x)have no element in common; hence y G (f(x) 4- m(x)) 4- s(x) by (f), since (y Gf(x) 4- m(x) V y  G s(x)) A f(x) 4- m(x) is connected with s(x) A f(x) 4- m(x) ands(x) have no element in common.
In the second case [i.e., y G s(x)], y G (f(x) 4-m(x)) 4-s(x), since (y Gf(x) 4- m(x) V y G s(x)) A f(x) 4- m(x) is connected with s(x) A f(x) 4- m(x) ands(x) have no element in common.
Proof o f  B 3 and B4:B3 and B4 are immediately evident on the basis of the definitions (a) -  (f)since VxCircle(x) is an axiom of the deductive system used for proving the
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consistency of TO.
Proof o f B5:
B5 results trivially since Vx-«x =  f(x) is a theorem of the system used for
proving the consistency of TO.
Proof o f B6:
Since Vx-im(x) =  c(x) is a theorem of the system used for proving the consis­
tency of TO. B6 is equivalent to Vx(m(x) 4- s(x) =  c(x)).
Assume y G m(x) 4- s(x); hence by (f): m(x) is connected with s(x) A m(x)
and s(x) have no element in common V m(x) =  s(x); but according to defini­
tions (a), (c), (e), and the axiom VxCircle(x), m(x) is not connected with s(x),
and — m(x) =  s(x). Therefore, ->3y(y € m(x) -I- s(x)), and hence m(x) -I- s(x) =
Xyr(yr /  / ) ’» hence by (d): m(x) + s(x) =  c(x).
Proof o f B7:
Since Vx-m(x) =  c(x) is a theorem. B7 is equivalent to Vx((f(x) 4- m(x)) 4-
f(x) =  c(x)) A Vx((f(x) 4- m(x)) -I- m(x) =  c(x)).
(i) Assume y G (f(x) +  m(x)) 4- f(x); hence by (f): f(x) + m(x) is connected
with f(x) A f(x) +  m(x) and f(x) have no element in common V f(x) + m(x)
=  f(x). However. f(x) + m(x) and f(x) have an element in common A-T(x) 4-
m(x) =  f(x) [for this result consider the following truths: Vy"(y" € f(x ) y" €
f(x)4-m(x)), 3y"(y// g  f(x)), 3y"(y" G m(x)), f(x) and m(x) have no element
in common]. Therefore, ->3y(y G (f(x) 4- m(x)) 4- f(x)); hence (f(x) + m(x)) +
f(x) =  Ay'(y' / / ) ;  hence by (d): (f(x) + m(x)) + f(x) =  c(x).
(ii) Assume y G (f(x) 4- m(x)) 4-m(x); continue mutatis mutandis as in (i).
Proof o f B8:
Since Vx-if(x) =  s(x) is a theorem, B8 is equivalent to Vx((f(x)4-s(x)) 4-f(x) =
c(x)) A Vx((f(x)4-s(x)) 4-s(x) =  c(x)).
(i) Assume y G (f(x) 4- s(x)) 4- f(x); hence by (f): f(x) + s(x) is connected
with f(x) Af(x)4-s(x) and f(x) have no element in common V f(x) + s(x) =  f(x).
However, f(x) + s(x) and f(x) have an element in common A-T(x) 4- s(x) =  f(x).
Therefore, ->3y(y G (f(x) 4- s(x)) 4- f(x)); hence (f(x) + s(x)) + f(x) =  ky'Çy' ±
/ ) ;  hence by (d): (f(x) + s(x)) + f(x) =  c(x).
(ii) Assume y G (f(x) 4- s(x)) 4- s(x); continue mutatis mutandis as in (i).
The verifying model for TO I have presented is trivial only with respect to
B5. But let the second-order ODs of T' (OVs x, x / . x" , etc., and ONs g, g',
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g", etc.) speak about (i.e., be used for quantifying over or referring to) the
spheres with positive finite radius in an infinite Euclidean space SP -  and
the sphere in SP ‘whose center is everywhere and whose surface nowhere’,
that is: SP itself (called ‘the supersphere’). Those spheres are certain sets of
points in SP (SP is, of course, the set of points in SP). The first-order ODs of
T' speak about the points in SP (hence the first-order OVs of T' -  y, yJ , y",
etc. -  are used for quantifying over the points in SP). I define:
For all second-order ODs t of T':
(a') m(t) :=  Ây(y is in the surface of t);24
24y is in the surface of t iff y e  t and 3r(r is a maximal distance between points of t and
3y'(y' € t and d (y ,/) =  r)). Here “r” and “d(y,y')” are designators for real numbers (as has
been said, T' also contains such designators): “r” is a variable that is used for quantifying
over the real numbers, and “d(y. v7)” is a functional expression, which is to be read as “the
distance between y and y'” (and refers to a uniquely determined real number for each y  and
each / ) .
25y is a center of t iff y e t  and Vr(r is a maximal distance between points of
t D V f W t y  Ç. t and y" G t and dfy'.y") =  r D d (/ ,y )  =  r /2  and d(y",y) =  r/2)).
26That is: y is on the straight line between /  and y", but is neither identical to yJ  nor
identical to y" (cf. footnote 22).
(b') s(t) :=  Ây(y is a center of t);25
(cz) f(t) :=  Ây(3y, 3"(y/ is a center of t Ay" is in the surface of t Ay is [prop­
erly] between y' and y")26 V ->3y"(y" is in the surface of t) A y is a
center of t).
The rest, (d') -  (f), is identical to (d) -  (f). Note that m(t) is now being
interpreted with respect to spheres (see (a')) as s(t) was previously interpreted
with respect to circles (cf. (c)), and that s(t) is now being interpreted with
respect to spheres (see (b')) as m(t) was previously interpreted with respect
to circles (cf. (a)).
Any sphere in SP is either a normal (finite) sphere or the supersphere.
For normal spheres x in SP, we have: ~im(x) =  c(x), s(x) =  Ay(y =  the center
of x), Ay(y is a center of x) /  x, f(x) =  XyBy"(y" is in the surface of x Ay
is [properly] between the center of x and y"), ~>s(x) =  f(x), ->x =  f(x). For
the supersphere g in SP (which sphere is SP itself), we have: m(g) =  c(g),
s(g) =  g, Kg) = s(g) [all three equations result because there is no r that is
a maximal distance between points of g; see (a'), (b'), (c'), and footnotes 24
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and 25], g =  f(g). B5 is now valid in a non-trivial way. With respect to g. Bl
is proved as follows: g = s(g); hence g =  (s(g) + c(g)) + s(g) by A227 (the
proof of which is the same as before); hence g = (f(g) + m(g)) + s(g) [because
of f(g) =  s(g), m(g) =  c(g)]. With respect to normal spheres. B 1 is proved as
previously, with respect to the model of circles. But let these brief remarks
about the specified -  rather more Thomasic -  other model of TO suffice.
27S =  s(g) =  s(g) +  s(#) [by A2(a)] =  (s(g) +  c(g)) +  s(g) [because s(g) +  c(#) =  s(g) by
A2(b)].
XII
Inconsistency, we have now seen, is not a charge that can be brought against
Thomas Aquinas’s central ontological doctrines about the (substantial) form,
the essence, the being and the matter of objects, and the laws of their compo­
sition in objects (i.e.. in existing substances and quasi-substances), whether
the objects be material or immaterial, created or uncreated. Note, inciden­
tally, that the Thomasic doctrine of the real distinction between the essence
and the being (or esse) in created objects is a trivial theorem of TO (see D4);
the special form that doctrine takes on if applied to created immaterial ob­
jects is also a theorem of TO. and not an entirely trivial one (see T 18(c),
considering D6. D4. D3. and T3).
I am now going to enrich T and TO, which makes it possible to cap­
ture -  in a formal language and axiomatic system -  an even larger portion
of Thomas Aquinas’s ontology than is captured by TO. As before, all steps
of theory-building will be taken in close correspondence to the words of
Thomas Aquinas himself. The extensions of T and TO I propose will serve to
strengthen the implicit definition of Thomasic terms that is given by the origi­
nal axiom-system. Among other things, I will provide a formal representation
of Thomasic individuation-principles (there are several, not just one). How­
ever, the formal approach is abandoned in the final part of the essay, where -
after having exhaustively treated the formal or structural interrelations of the
ontological notions involved in Thomas’s theory of the fundamental compo­
sition of objects -  I analyze the conceptual content itself of those notions. I
will conclude with a synopsis of Thomas’s theory of forms.
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XIII
T enriched by the monadic predicates L(t) and H(t) constitutes the language
T*. The syntactical rules of T (see section V) are rewritten for T*. The
rewriting simply consists in replacing “T” by “T*”, with one exception: the
specification of PSLs for T* is this:
10*. Primary sententials (PSLs) of T*:
(a) If 5 and Ô' are EDs of T*, then (5 =  5') is a PSL of T*;
(b) if t is an OD of T*, then L(t) and H(t) is a PSL of T*;
(c) PSLs of T* are only expressions that are generable by (a) and (b).
The intended interpretation of T* is the same as that of T, with the addition
that a sentential L(t) of T* is to be read as ‘t is a living object [i.e., living
substance or quasi-substance]’. and a sentential of H(t) of T* as ‘t is a human
substance [hence: human object]’.
I continue with a definition that can be given in T* (but not in T):
D9 A(5) := 3v (L(v )A M (v ) A 5 =  a(v)) [for all EDs 5 and OVs v of T*,
provided v does not occur in 5]
According to the intended interpretation of T* and in view of the Thomasic
doctrine which states that a soul is the actuating form of a living body, A(5),
as defined by D9. can be read as l 8 is a soul [anima]’. If t refers to a living
body (in other words, if L(t) A M(t) is true), a(t) can be read as ‘the soul of t’.
Aquinas says:
35. anima est primum quo vivimus, cum tarnen vivamus anima et corpore:
ergo anima est forma corporis viventis. Et haec est definitio superius de anima
posita. quod anima est actus primus physici corporis potentia vitam habentis
(In Aristotelis librum de anima commentarium, liber 2, lectio 4, 271 [of the
continuously enumerated sections]).
It is evident that ‘forma- in this quotation does not mean pure form but ac­
tuating form; if it were otherwise, then the soul would not be "actus primus
physici corporis potentia vitam habentis’ (the emphasis is mine). Moreover, if
‘forma’ did not mean actuating form but pure form in quotation 35, it would
be incorrect to call the composite of body and soul ‘this something’ (‘hoc
aliquid-), in other words: it would be incorrect to call it an ‘object- (more
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particularly, a material object’).* 28 It would only be correct to call the com­
posite of body, soul, and being (esse) ‘this something’. But Thomas is quite
unambiguous in this regard:
-8An ’object' in the sense of ‘substance or quasi-substance’ is precisely what I take
Thomas to mean by ‘hoc aliquid- , and Aristotle by ‘lode t ï .
~9 It cannot be included in the ‘corpus’ because for Aquinas not matter but ‘forma’ is the
vehicle/the bringer of being: see quotations 8, 9, and 10 (and the remarks referring to them).
30According to T24. no object is its matter. But perhaps the matter of an object is some­
times another object? However, this option of theory formation will be eliminated by T48.
36. compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid (Summa theologiae,
1,75, 2).
Consider also
37. ex anima et corpore résultat unum esse in uno composito (De ente et
essentia. 4, 29).
From this last quotation, it is evident that the esse is nothing properly added to
‘anima et corpus’ but results already by the very union of the two, which can
only be because the esse is already included in the ‘anima’,29 the actuating
form of the ‘compositum’ (i.e., of the living body).
Evidently, ‘corpus vivens’ and ‘corpus potentia vitam habens’ have dif­
ferent meanings. A living body is obviously an object (a plant, an animal, a
human being), while a body that potentially has life is the matter (or more
correctly speaking in view of section XXIII: the first representative of the
matter) of a living body, and therefore not obviously an object.30 Aquinas
uses the word ‘corpus’ (if it does not simply mean material object) both in the
sense of ‘corpus vivens' and in the sense of ‘corpus potentia vitam habens’,
and it must be determined from the context what exactly is meant by him.
When he says ‘compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid', then he
means by ‘corpus’ the same as is meant by ‘corpus potentia vitam habens';
when, however, he says
38. Ex praemissis igilur manifeste ostendi potest animam humanam non cor-
rumpi. corrupto corpore (Summa contra gentiles. 2, 79),
he is using ‘corpus’ in the sense of ‘corpus vivens’.
D9 is the first definition that introduces a predicate which forms well-
formed expressions not only with ODs of T* but also with other EDs of T*.
Another definition that introduces such a predicate is the following:
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DIO Sub(ö) :=  3v(5 =  v) [for all EDs 8 and OVs v of T*. provided v does
not occur in 5]
According to the intended interpretation of T*, Sub(ö), as defined by DIO,
can be read as ‘5 is a [individual] substance or quasi-substance’, or as 8 is
an object’, or as “5 subsists’. ‘VxSub(x)’ is a trivial logical truth; it means,
according to the intended interpretation, that every object is an object. But,
from it, we cannot validly infer for every ED 8 of T*: Sub(ö), which, if
it could be validly inferred for every such 8, would mean (according to the
intended interpretation) that all considered entities, be they quantified over
or merely designated, are objects (i.e., a substance or quasi-substance). This
would certainly contradict Thomasic doctrine. Fortunately, that step of in­
ference cannot be validly taken, because the deductive restrictions that were
specified for the logic of T (see section VI) also apply to the logic of T*.
TO, rewritten for T* and enriched by the following three axioms
Cl Vx(H(x) D L(x) A M(x))
C2 Vx(H(x) D ^ ( x 7) Ax' =  a(x)))
C3 3xH(x),
constitutes a part of the system TO*.
Concerning Cl: According to the intended interpretation, Cl asserts that
every human substance is a living material object. But is not Socrates a hu­
man substance which is not a living material object? Here it must be recalled
that we are using ‘object’ in the sense of ‘existent object’ (see section III).
Now, ‘existent’ may mean the same as ‘now existent’ or the same as ‘at some
time existent’, and accordingly, also two meanings of ‘living’ have to be dis­
tinguished (at least for the purposes of this essay), since it is certainly true
that
39. vivere enim est esse viventis (Summa contra gentiles, 2, 57).
If we take ‘existent’ to mean the same as 'now existent’, and ‘living’ the same
as 'now living’, then Socrates turns out to be not a human substance (because
he is not an object, because he is not an existent object, because he is not a
now existent object) -  just as he turns out to be not a living (i.e., now living)
material object. If. however, we take ‘existent’ to mean the same as 'at some
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time existent’, and ‘living’ the same as "at some time living’, then Socrates
can certainly be regarded as a human substance (and hence as an object, an
existent object, an at some time existent object) -  and certainly as a living
(i.e., at some time living) material object. Instead of “human substance”, we
say more familiarly “human being”, and instead of “living material object”
“living body”. It should be borne in mind that these predicates (and all other
ordinary language predicates put forward as readings of the formal predicates
that form sententials precisely with the ODs of T*) are supposed to have
an existential (and substantial or quasi-substantial) import, according to the
intended interpretation of T*. -  There can be no question but that Cl squares
with Thomasic (but not easily with Cartesian or Platonic) doctrine.
Concerning C2: C2 asserts that the actuating form -  that is, in view of
Cl, the souP1-  of any human being is a created immaterial object (an in­
telligence). This cannot be expressed in the following manner: Vx(H(x) D
I(a(x))), since this is not a well-formed expression of T*. For according to
D6 and D3, “I(a(x))” would entail “m(a(x)) =  c(a(x))”; but the latter expres­
sion (and therefore also the former) is ungrammatical according to the syntax
of T (see sections III and V) -  and also, of course, according to the syntax of
T* (cf. its description above). Concerning the Thomasic doctrinal justifica­
tion of C2, consider the following:
40. Est ergo distinctio earum [intelligentiarum] ad invicem. secundum gradum
potentiae et actus; ita quod in te lligen t superior, quae magis propinqua est
primo [enti], habet plus de actu el minus de potentia, et sic de aliis. Et hoc
completur in anima humana, quae tenet ultimum gradum in substanliis intel-
lectualibus (De ente et essentia. 4, 29).* 32
J | C1 requires that human beings are living bodies, and in the case of a living body x, the
locution “the soul of x” can be used instead of “a(x)” [“the actuating form of x”], as was
determined earlier in this section.
32Note that Thomas is here saying that the human soul is an intellectual substance (and
not merely that it is an immaterial object [re.s], which, as such, might merely be a quasi­
substance). He is certainly not always ready to go thus far. But probably he is here, instead
of being inconsistent, merely using the word “substantia” in an extended sense (see footnote
3). What is clear is that all other created immaterial objects are substances for Thomas, and
not only in an extended sense.
Concerning C3: C3 simply states an empirical fact: there is at least one
human being. C3 is the first axiom of the formal theory (emerging in TO and
TO*) that states the existence of a specific kind of object.
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Aquinas would probably have accepted Vx(H(x) =  L(x)AM(x) A 3 / (I(x/)
Ax/ =  a(x))) as true (given its intended interpretation). Not so a modern
Thomist, who knows that the universe is much larger than Aquinas thought
it to be. For all we know, the universe may well contain a living body whose
actuating form is a created immaterial object, but which is not a human being
(say, because it has an amoeba-like appearance).
C2 is an axiom that many people these days are likely to reject; for, using
C3, we can deduce from C2: 3x/I(x/) -  There is at least one created imma­
terial object. C l, in contrast, is not likely to be rejected; using C3, we can
deduce from C 1: 3xM(x) -  There is at least one material object (but, in view
of T13, it has to be a created one).
There is convincing evidence that Thomas would have accepted Vx(H(x)
=  L(x) AM(x) ASub(a(x))) as true (given its intended interpretation): We have
Cl and
41. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens.
esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens (Summa theologiae. 1. 75, 2),
which supports Vx(H(x) D Sub(a(x))).33 Moreover. Thomas states
3 3Note that, in contrast to “I(a(x))”, “Sub((a(jc))” is syntactically correct. As is obvi­
ous from DIO, “Sub((a(x))” does not involve the substitution of “a(x)” into a PAE of T*.
“I(a(x))”, in contrast, does involve the substitution of “a(x)” into PAEs of T* (see D6, D3).
42. relinquitur quod, cum animae brutorum animalium per se non operentur,
non sint subsistentes: similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem
(Summa theologiae, 1, 75, 3),
which supports Vx(-iH(x) AL(x) A M(x) D -^Sub(a(x))), since Thomas would
accept (a) that every non-human living material object is a “brute animal”
or a plant, and (b) that the souls of plants (like the souls of “brute animals”
according to quotation 42) do not subsist (i.e., are not objects). From C l,
Vx(H(x) D Sub(a(x))), and Vx(^H(x) A L(x) A M(x) D -iSub(a(x))) we get
Vx(H(x) =  L(x) AM(x) ASub(a(x))) as an obvious logical consequence.
‘L(x)AM(x)ASub(a(x))’ and ‘L(x)AM(x)A3x/(I(x/) Ax/=  a(x))’ are, ini­
tially, not provably equivalent sententials of T*: from ‘3x/(I(x/) Ax' =  a(x))’
we get ‘Sub(a(x))’ (by DIO), but, so far, we do not get ‘3x/(I(x/) Ax' =  a(x))’
from ‘Sub(a(x))’. However, the gap between ‘L(x) A M(x) A Sub(a(x))’ and
‘L(x) AM(x) A 3x/(I(x/) Ax/ =  a(x))’ can be closed, in keeping with Thoma-
sic doctrine, by adding two further axioms to TO* (and remembering D6):
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C4 VxVx'( /  =  a(x) V xJ =  f(x) D -'M(x7) )
(If an object is the actuating or pure form o f an object, then it is imma­
terial)
C5 VxVx/ (M(x) Ax ' =  a(x) D C(x'))
(If an object is the actuating form of a material object, then it is cre­
ated)
C4, of course, logically contains B5 and T2 as special cases (in view of D3).
It is a consequence of C5 (together with Cl) that the soul of a human being
is not a divine object, or in other words, Vx(H(x) D -i3x/ (D(x/ ) Ax' =  a(x))):
Assume H(x), Hx'(D(x/ ) Ax' =  a(x)) [for reductio]; hence by Cl: M(x), and
hence 3x, (M(x) Ax' =  a(x) AD(x')); hence by C5: 3x'(C(x/ ) AD(x')) -  which
is a contradiction in view of D5.
XIV
Following the lead of D9 and DIO, we can define a whole series of entity-
predicates (in distinction from ob/ecf-predicates, like M(t), C(t), I(t), D(t),
B(t), and E(t), which do not take AEs of T* -  or of T -  as arguments of
predication):
D ll (ai)F P (5 ):= 3v(5  =  f(v))
(a2)FA (5):=  3v(0 =  a(v))
(b) S(ö) := 3 v (5  =  s(v))
(c)W(5) := 3v(5 =  w(v))
(d) Mat(5) := 3v(M(v) A 5 =  m(v))
(e) N(5) := 3v(5 =  c(v))
(f) F(5) := FP(5) VFA(5) [for all EDs 5 and OVs v of T*, provided v
does not occur in <51
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The definienda of the seven definitions comprised by Dl 1 are to be read, in
the order of their occurrence, as ‘<5 is a pure (substantial) form’, ‘5 is an ac­
tuating (substantial) form’, ‘5 is an esse' [instead of ‘5 is a being’, which is
ambiguous: 8 is a being’ could also mean the same as ’Ô is an entity’], '5 is
an essence’, ‘5 is a (parcel of) matter’ [‘5 is a materia désignai a'-, cf. quo­
tation 59 in section XX], ‘5 is an empty aspect’, "8 is a (substantial) form’.
Since we are still concerned with Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine on the funda­
mental composition of objects, substantial forms are the only forms we are
dealing with (leaving aside the existence [esse] of an object x, which is a form
and, for most x, a non-substantial form; see section XXIV). This is the reason
why I say ‘form’ instead of ‘substantial form’ (that is, usually -  aside from
occasional reminders of what is really intended by the shorter expression; in
section XXIV. however, I will speak in the fully explicit way). But of course
Aquinas also recognizes forms that are not simpliciter substantial, or that are
simpliciter non-substantial: forms that are a substantial form only of some
objects that they are a form of, and forms that are a substantial form of no
object that they are a form of.
By being a substantial form a form is not automatically a subsistent form,
that is, a form which is an object, perhaps even a substance in the full sense.
Without doubt, however, some substantial forms are for Aquinas subsistent
forms (and I now continue the numbering of theorems -  all theorems of TO
being also theorems of TO*):
T30 Vx'FA(x')
(There is an object which is an actuating fonn)
Proof -. By C3: 3xH(x); hence by C2: BxHx, (I(Ay) A ?  =  a(x)), and hence
3x'3x(x' =  a(x)); hence by DI l(a2): Bx/FA(x/ ).
That is to say, the existence of subsistent actuating forms -  namely, of human
souls -  follows, in view of C2, from the existence of human beings. I will
prove later on -  on the basis of one more axiom of TO* -  that there is also a
subsistent pure form.
Being an immaterial object coincides with being an object which is an
actuating form (and therefore, nota bene, on the basis of T l, T2, and D3 also
with being an object which is its actuating form):
T31 Vx(-M(x) =  FA(x))
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Proof-, (i) Assume ->M(x); hence by D3. T l: x =  a(x), and hence: 3x'(x =
a(x')), hence by Dll(a2): FA(x). (ii) Assume FA(x); hence by Dll(a2):
=  a(x')), hence by C4: - ’M(x).
Furthermore we have:
T32 Vx(D(x) □ FP(x))
(Every divine object is a subsistent pure fonn, i.e., a pure form which
is an object)
Proof : Assume D(x); hence by T21(e): x =  f(x), and hence Sx^x =  ffaöh
hence by DI l(a i): FP(x).
The converse of T32 is not provable (and I leave it at that).34 Furthermore we
have:
34 Considerations that are relevant to the question of whether Vx(FP(x) D D(x)) should be
provable in TO* follow in section XV; see. in particular, the end of section XV.
T33 Vx(FP(x) D FA(x))
(Every subsistent pure form is a subsistent actuating form)
Proof : Assume FP(x), hence by DI 1 (ai ): 3x/ (x =  f(x')); hence by C4: -^M(x);
hence by T l, D3: x = a(x), and hence Bx^x =  a(x')); hence by Dll(a2):
FA(x).
From T33 we easily obtain by DI 1(f):
T34 Vx(F(x) =  FA(x))
(The subsistent forms are the subsistent actuating forms)
And from the general equivalences T34 and T31 together, we obtain:
T35 Vx(M(x) =  -F(x))
(Every object is either a material object or a subsistent form)
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XV
Aquinas holds that there is at most one subsistent esse (an esse which is an
object):
43. Esse autem, in quantum est esse, non potest esse diversum: potest autem
diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab
esse hominis. Illud igitur quod est esse subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum
tantum (Summa contra gentiles, 2, 52).
In other words, ‘3xS(x) D Hx(S(x) AVx/ (S(x') D x =  x '))’ is true for Thomas
(in the intended interpretation), and it is logically equivalent to a further ax­
iom of TO*:
C6 VxVx'(S(x) AS(x') D x =  x/ )
Moreover, Thomas certainly believes that there is a divine object:
C7 3xD(x)
By making use of C6 and C7. the following theorems can be deduced:
T36 HxFP(x)
(There is a subsistent pure form)
Proof -. T32, C7.
T37 3!xS(x)
(There is precisely one subsistent esse)
Proof -. By C7: dxD(x); hence by T21(c): 3x(x =  s(x)), and hence EixHx^x =
s(x')); hence by DI 1(b): 3xS(x); hence by C6: 3!xS(x).
T38 Vx(D(x) D S(x))
(Every divine object is a subsistent esse)
Proof -. Assume D(x); hence by T21(c): x =  s(x), and hence Ex^x =  s(x/ ));
hence by DI 1(b): S(x).
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T39 VxVx, (D(x) A D ( /)  D x =  / )
(There is at most one divine object)
Proof: T38. C6.
Concerning the Thomasic background of C6 and T38 (and its proof with the
help of T21(c)), and of T39 (and its proof with the help of T38, C6), consider
the following quotation in addition to quotation 43:
44. Esse proprium uniuscuiusque rei est [in quantum est esse?] unum tantum.
Sed ipse Deus est esse suum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossible est igitur esse
nisi unum Deum (Summa contra gentiles, 1,42).
T40 3!xD(x)
(There is exactly one divine object)
Proof : C l. T39.
T41 Vx(D(x) =  S(x))
(The divine objects are the subsistent "esses")
Proof : T38 is one half of T41. and already proven. Assume S(x); by Cl:
Bx'D(.v'). and hence by T38: 3x, (D(x/ ) A S (/)) ; hence by C6 [because of
S(x), S(x')]: x  =  x', and therefore: D(x) [because of D(x')].
I introduce, as part of the logical machinery of T*, the functor of definite de­
scription “i” (the Greek letter iota), which forms definite object-descriptions
(DODs) of T* from monadic predicates of T* by binding the free OV in such
predicates. The DODs of T* are ODs of T*. but are not counted among the
ONs of T* although, in one respect, they function like ONs of T*: if the for­
mative predicate of a DOD is true of exactly one object, then the DOD names
that object: otherwise, it names the moon (say). Syntactically, a DOD of T*
can stand anywhere in an SL of T* where an ON of T* can stand (presuppos­
ing the use of an appropriate OV). However. DODs of T*, in contrast to ONs
of T*. are not amenable to “all”-generalization.3- Employing the (standard)
logic of the i-functor, we can prove:
Premises that do not contain “txD(x)” (see C7 and T39) together logically imply
D(ixD(x)). But they certainly do not logically imply Vx'D(x') (although “lxD(x)” does
not occur in this latter sentence of T*).
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T42 ixD(x) =  lxS(x)
{God is the subsistent esse)
Proof: T41,T40.
And Thomas says:
45. Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens (Summa theologiae, 1, 44,1).
The reading of txD(x) -  “the divine object” -  as “God” is made formally
official by the following definition:
D12 d := ixD(x)
D12 is immediately employed in proving
T43 d =  s(d) A Vx(x =  s(x) D x — d)
(God is the only object that is its being)
Proof : By T40: 3!xD(x), and hence D(txD(x)): hence by D12: D(d); hence
by T21(c): d =  s(d). And assume x = s(x); hence 3x\x =  s(x/ )) A 3x'(d =
s(x/ )) [the second conjunct follows because of d =  s(d)]; hence by DI 1(b)
and C6: x =  d.
Compare -  with T43 and its proof -  the following quotation (which is a con­
tinuation of quotation 43):
46. Illud [esse] ergo quod est esse subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum tan­
tum. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil igitur
aliud praeter ipsum potest esse suum esse. Oportet igitur in omni substan­
tia quae est praeter ipsum, esse aliud ipsam substantiam et eius esse (Summa
contra gentiles, 2. 52).
Furthermore the following theorems can be proved:
T44 w(d) =  s(d) A Vx(w(x) =  s(x) D x =  d)
(God is the only object whose essence is its being)
Proof : By T40: 3!xD(x), and hence D(txD(x)); hence by D12: D(d), hence
by D5, D4: w(d) =  s(d). And assume w(x) =  s(x); hence by D4, T15: D(x);
hence by T39 and D(d): x =  d.
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T45 W(d) AFA(d) AFP(d)
(God is a subsistent essence, a subsistent actuating form, and a subsis­
tent pure form)
Proof : By T40. D12: D(d); hence by T 21 (b): d =  w(d). and hence 3 / ( d  =
w(x/ )); hence by DI 1(c): W(d). By D(d), T16(a), D3, T l: d =  a(d). and
hence 3 / ( d  =  a(x')); hence by DI l(a2): FA(d). By D(d), T21(e): d =  f(d),
and hence 3x, (d =  f(x')); hence by DI l(ai): FP(d).
While, given the present state of the system TO*, it is possible to prove both
that God is the only object that is its essence, and that God is the only ob­
ject that is its pure form, it is neither possible to prove that God is the only
subsistent essence (the only object that is an essence), nor that God is the
only subsistent pure form  (the only object that is a pure form). To my knowl­
edge. Thomas nowhere asserts that God is the only subsistent essence. And
of course he nowhere asserts that God is the only subsistent pure form, since
he does not distinguish between actuating form and pure form (which non­
distinction is correct for God -  see T21(a) -  but incorrect for all other ob­
jects). Thus, to Thomas Aquinas’s mind, there simply are many subsistent
forms: God. human souls, other created intelligences, in other words: all
immaterial objects. But the two italicized propositions (see above in this
paragraph) can certainly be considered to be in the spirit of Thomasic ontol­
ogy. If VxVx, (W(x) A W(x') D x =  x7 ) and VxV/(FP(x) A FP(x') D x =  x7)
were added as axioms to TO*, those propositions would become provable in
TO* (given the intended interpretation of T*), and in consequence also the
following would be provable: d =  ixS(x) =  txW(x) — txFP(x) -  God is the
subsistent esse, which is the subsistent essence, which is the subsistent pure
form. I nevertheless refrain from adding the mentioned principles as axioms
to TO*: they are in the Thomasic spirit, but they were certainly not evident
to Thomas himself.
XVI
Whereas Thomas Aquinas acknowledges many subsistent forms (and we may
add, in the Thomasic spirit, what Thomas himself did not assert: all of these
forms are actuating, precisely one of them is also pure), and precisely one
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subsistent esse, and at least one subsistent essence (and once more we may
add. in the Thomasic spirit, what Thomas himself did not assert: there is no
other subsistent essence), Thomas does not acknowledge a subsistent matter
(see quotation 10):
C8 ->3xMat(x)
And of course we can add to this axiom
C9 ^HxN(x)
(There is no subsistent empty aspect)
On the basis of DIO and DI 1(d), C8 is equivalent to
T46 Vx/ (M(x/ ) D -S u b (m (/))) ,
and on the basis of DIO and DI 1(e), C9 is equivalent to
T47 V x '-Sub(c(/))).
T47 has B4(a), Vx-a =  c(x), as a logical consequence. From T46 and T47,
we obtain:
T48 Vx/ ->Sub(m(x/ )))
(The matter o f no object is an object)
Proof : (i) Assume M(x'); hence by T46: ->Sub(m(x/ )). (ii) Assume - M ^ ) ;
hence by D3: m(x/ ) =  c(x'); by T47: ->Sub(c(x/ )); hence -iSub (m(x')).
T24 -  Vx->x =  m(x) -  is a direct logical consequence of T48. As T48 is a gen­
eralization of T24, so Vx/ ->W(m(x/ )) is a generalization of T25: Vx-iw(x) =
m(x). But in order to obtain Vx'-iW(m(x/ )) -  The matter o f no object is an
essence -  as a theorem, we need to add further axioms:
CIO Vx'(M(x/ ) D ->W(m(x')))




follows in the same manner as T48 follows from T46 and T47. (Because the
axioms C4. C9, C l l  logically contain, as special cases of them, axioms of
the system TO -  namely. B5. B4(a), B4(e) -  C4. C9. Cl 1 can replace those
axioms of TO.)
XVII
I leave TO* in the state attained so far. Whatever TO* will finally amount
to, let TO** be TO* enriched by the Thomasic individuation axioms. Such
individuation axioms have the form VvVv'(B’0[vj =  </>iv'j] D A[v, v'])36 or
the form VvVv'(A[v, v'] D ^[v] =  0[v']), where 0 is an AE of T* having v
or v' as its OV ([</> [v] is 0 with v, 0[v'] is 0 with v').
Is every S ofT* having the form VvVv'(0Lvj =  D v =  v ') a Thoma­
sic individuation principle? Even if it were so according to the records,
we nevertheless could not consistently add ‘Every S of T* having the form
VvVv'(0[v] =  0[v'] D v =  v') is an axiom of TO**’ to the specification of
the other axioms of TO**, since already in TO* we can prove the following
theorem:
T50 2x3x, (a(x) =  a(x') A->x =  x/ )
(There are objects that are different although their actuating forms are
identical)
Proof: By C3: BxH(x); hence by C2: 3x(H(x) AHr'C^x') Ax' =  a(x))),
and hence 3x3x'(H(x) Al(x') Ax' =  a(x)); hence by C l, D6: 3xBx'(M(x) A
~iM(x') Ax' =  a(x)); hence by T l, D3: 3x3x'(M(x) A -iM(x') Ax' =  a(x') A
x f =  a(x)), and hence 3x3x'(a(x) =  a(x') A -x  =  x/ ).
The actuating form of the soul of a human being, which is an immaterial
object, is the soul itself, which, in turn, is the actuating form of the human
being. Thus, the actuating form of the soul and the actuating form of the
human being are identical. But the soul of the human being is not identical to
,6 B[0[v ] =  0[v']] is a SL of T* (with the OVs v and v ') which either is identical to the PSL
0[v] =  0 ^  or includes it as a conjunct. Note that an important specialization of A[v. v'] is
v =  v'.
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the human being since the former is an immaterial object, the latter a material
one. Thomas himself says:
47. Plato posuit quod homo non sit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore:
sed quod ipsa anima ulens corpore sit homo; sicut Petrus non est aliquid com­
positum ex homine et indumento, sed homo utens indumento. Hoc autem esse
impossibile ostenditur (Summa contra gentiles, 2, 57).
It is in keeping with the purely auxiliary character of empty aspects to adopt
3x3x/ (x =  x Ax' =  x7 D c(x) =  c(x/ )), or rather, for the sake of briefness, its
logical equivalent VxVx/ (c(x) =  c(x')) as a Thomasic individuation axiom:
Il Vx\/x'(c(x) = c(x/ ))
(The empty aspects o f all objects are identical)
11 has to be adopted without exegetical justification since there is no evidence
for it in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas had no idea of empty
aspects; their sole Thomasic justification -  an indirect one -  is their great
usefulness for the systematic formulation of his ontological doctrines. Note
that II can be taken to justify the introduction of an aspect-constant: “c*” -
‘the empty aspect'. But if such a constant is introduced, then it has to be kept
in mind that it would not be another OD of T* (or of T**): “f(c*)”, “s(c*)”,
etc. are as syntactically nonsensical as are “f(c(x))”, “s(c(x'))”, etc. Given II
we can easily prove:
T51 3 x 3 /(m(x) = m(./) A->x =  / )
(There are objects that are different although their matters are identi­
cal)
I present the proof in a semiformal way: Both d (God) and a human soul x'
(it is provable in TO** that there are such objects) are immaterial objects (as
is also provable); hence by the definition of immateriality: m(d) =  c(d) and
m(x') =  c (/), and therefore by II: m(d) =  m(x/ ) -  the “matters” of d and /
are identical. But d and /  are nevertheless different, since /  is an created
object, but d is not. Obviously, T51 shows, like T50, that VvVv, (̂ >[v] =
0[v'] d  v =  v') cannot be adopted as an axiom schema (so that all of its
instances would be Thomasic individuation axioms).
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Aquinas does not assert VxVx7(m(x) =  m(x7) D x  =  x7). When he says
48. individuationis principium est materia (De ente et essentia, 2, 7),
he is not asserting an individuation principle for all objects (as is clear from
the context), but an individuation principle only for all material objects:
12 VxVx7(M(x) AM(x7) Am(x) =  m(x7) D x  =  x7)
(Material objects that have the same matter are identical)
However, if ‘object* (‘substance or quasi-substance’) is taken in a broad
sense, then there are obvious counterexamples even to 12 -  for example, the
statue x and the lump of bronze x' that x is made of. Thus, if 12 is to be plausi­
ble, and not just Thomasically valid, the word “object” must be understood in
an appropriately narrow sense. But it is difficult to characterize that sense in a
principled way, and not just in an ad hoc way. Why does a statue count as an
object, but not the lump of bronze that the statue is made of? Why does a hu­
man being (and the human being’s soul) count as an object, but not the human
being's body (“body” taken in the sense of corpus potentia vitam habens, not
in the sense of corpus vivens', regarding this important distinction, see sec­
tion XIII)? Note that both the lump of bronze and the human body (more
precisely: the corpus potentia vitam habens) can exist on their own (like the
human soul), without being integrated into a statue or a human being; for the
lump of bronze, this is even its natural way of existence. But, nevertheless,
neither the human body (in abstraction from the human being) nor the lump
of bronze are counted as objects by Aquinas (if they were, he could not -  in
reason -  assert 12). A rationale that suggests itself is this: Among material
entities with the same matter, only the one with the relatively highest degree
of inner organization and completeness is (or is counted as) an object.
Just as VxVx7(m(x) =  m(x') D x  =  x7) is not Thomasically valid but VxVx7
(M(x) A M(x') A m(x) =  m(x7) D x =  x7) is, so VxVx7(a(x) =  a(x') D x =  x7)
is not Thomasically valid but the following is:
T52 VxVx7(-M (x) A -M (x') A a(x) =  a(x7) D x =  x7)
(Immaterial objects that have the same actuating form are identical)
Proof: Assume -^M(x) A -M (x7) Aa(x) =  afx7); hence by D3, T l: x =  a(x) A
x7 =  a(x7 ) A a(x) =  a(x7), and hence: x =  x7.
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Moreover, Aquinas says:
49. animae humanae multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem corporum. ut
supra ostensum est (Summa contra gentiles, 2, 80).
Hence we can add VxVx7(H(x) A H(x7) A a(x) =  a(x7) D x  =  x7) -  Human be­
ings whose souls are identical are themselves identical -  to the Thomasic
individuation axioms. That is, we can do so if we take the word “corpus”
to mean corpus vivens in the above quotation; if we take it to mean corpus
potentia vitam habens, we rather ought to add VxVx7(H(x) AH(x') Aa(x) =
a(x7) D m(x) =  m(x/ )) to those axioms. However, which of the two sentences
we choose for axiomatization does not matter after all since they are provably
equivalent on the basis of Cl and 12. And so are VxVx7 (M(x) AM(x') Aa(x) =
a(x') D x =  x7) and VxVx7(M(x) A M(x/ ) A a(x) =  a(x') D m(x) =  m(x7)). As
a matter of fact, I posit as a further Thomasic individuation axiom:
13 VxVx7(M(x) AM(x') Aa(x) =  a(x7) D x =  x7)
(Material objects that have the same actuating form are identical)
13 is more general than VxVx/ (H(x) A H(x7) A a(x) =  a(x') D x =  ? )  (in view
of Cl), and indeed Thomas says:
50. Impossibile est enim plurium numéro diversorum esse unam formam.
sicut impossibile est quod eorum sit unum esse (Summa theologiae. 1, 76, 2).
This cannot be represented by VxVx7(a(x) =  a(x') Dx =  x7), which is contra­
dicted by T50; and it cannot be represented by VxVx7(f(x) =  f(x') D x =  x7),
since Aquinas clearly takes ‘forma’ to mean actuating form in the context
from which quotation 50 is taken:
51. Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus esse unum omnium hominum.
omnino est impossibile [...] Similiter etiam patet hoc esse impossibile, si,
secundum sententiam Aristotelis, intellectus ponatur pars, seu potentia, ani­
mae quae est hominis forma. Impossibile est enim plurium numéro diverso­
rum esse unam formam, sicut impossibile est quod eorum sit unum esse [quo­
tation 50; my italics]: nam forma est essendi principium (Summa theologiae.
1,76, 2).
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The argument in quotation 51, of which quotation 50 is a part, is used by
Aquinas to decide the question ‘Utrum intellectivum principium multiplice-
tur secundum multiplicationem corporum’ in the positive. For deciding this
question, it is sufficient to suppose that different material objects have dif­
ferent actuating forms, that is: it is sufficient to accept 13 । which. of course,
is logically equivalent to its contrapositive VxVx7(M(x) A M(x') A ->x =  x7 D
- ’a(x) =  a(x7))]. 13 is what Aquinas intends by ’impossibile est enim plurium
numéro diversorum esse unam formam’. In consequence of 13, different hu­
man beings have different souls or in other words: VxVx7(H(x) A H (/) A~ix=
x' D - ’a(x) =  a(x7))], and therefore also the intellects of different human be­
ings are different. (One may doubt this last inference, but Aquinas certainly
did not.)
Quotation 51 contains more propositional information than is pertaining
to 13 alone, namely, propositional information that is represented by the prin­
ciple VxVx7(M(x) A M(x') A s(x) =  s(x7) D x  =  x7). If we say that part of
what is asserted in quotation 51 is represented by 13, and not -  in spite of
the literal wording of that quotation -  by VxVx7(a(x) =  a(x7) D x = x 7), then
it is only appropriate to say that another part of what is asserted in quotation
51 (i.e., what follows after “sicut”) is represented by VxVx7(M(x) AM(x') A
s(x) =  s(x7) D x =  x7), and not -  again in spite of the literal wording -  by
VxVx7(s(x) =  s(x7) D x  =  x7). However, there is independent support in the
works of Thomas Aquinas for this latter, logically stronger principle:
52. esse diversum est in diversis (De ente et essentia, 5. 30).
Thus (and because it seems overall unobjectionable), I accept as a fourth
Thomasic individuation axiom
14 VxVx7(s(x) =  s(x7) D x =  x7) .
XVIII
14 shows that, while not every sentence of T* having the form VvVv'(0(v) —
0 (v 7) D v =  v') is a Thomasic individuation axiom, at least one such sen­
tence is. Is VxVx7(f(x) =  f(x7) D x =  x7) another one? It seems the question
has to be answered in the negative. It is a fact that there are not one but many
human beings, and they all have the same pure (substantial) form: humanity
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(whereas each of the many human beings has a different actuating (substan­
tial) form, i.e., a different soul). Hence there are different objects that have
the same pure form.
This argument presupposes that the pure form of a human being x  is hu­
manity. But alternatively we could say that the pure form of a human being x
is not humanity but rather the humanity of x, and that if x  and x7 are different
human beings, then the humanity o f x -  the pure form of x -  is different from
the humanity o f x7 -  the pure form of x7; and that consequently there is no
counterexample to VxVx/ (f(x) =  f(x') D x =  x7) in the realm of human beings.
Now, which of these two arguments is in the spirit of Thomas Aquinas?
In Thomasic ontological doctrine there are several distinctions concern­
ing forms (the word “form” is still to be taken in the sense of ‘substantial
form’). The distinction between subsistent forms and non-subsistent forms
has been thematized in this essay, and so has been the distinction between
pure forms and actuating forms (a distinction indispensable for Thomasic
ontological doctrine but unfortunately not recognized by Aquinas himself).
Now, concerning forms, yet another Thomasic distinction becomes crucial.
It is the distinction between universal and individual forms. In the following
passages Thomas is speaking about universal forms, and implicitly also about
individual forms:
53. formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia, individuantur per materiam,
quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum substans: forma vero,
quantum est de se. nisi aliquid aliud impediat, recipi potest a pluribus (Summa
theologiae, 1, 3, 2).
54. Forma vero finitur per materiam. inquantum forma, in se considerata,
communis est ad multa: sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma deter­
minate huius rei (Summa theologiae, 1,7, 1).
Universal forms that are receivable in matter ‘can be received by many’ and
are individuated by matter. But individuated universal forms are. of course,
no longer universal forms, they are individual forms. For example, as a con­
sequence of being individuated by the matter of the human being x. the uni­
versal form humanity becomes an individual form: the humanity of x.
According to Thomasic ontological doctrine, every object has exactly one
individual and exactly one universal form. The universal form of an object
is simply its (natural) kind (species), which is particularized in the object to
constitute the individual form of the object. Thus, for every human being x,
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the universal (substantial) form o f x is humanity, and the individual (sub­
stantial) form o f x is the [particular] humanity of x. We already know that
the actuating form of a human being x is the soul o f x. But now, what is the
pure form of x?
I proceed on the assumption that the functions assigning the universal
form and the individual form to objects are each identical (on the basis of
Thomasic doctrine) to one of the six fundamental aspect-functions treated in
this essay. From the six, we can rule out the matter of the empty aspect of
and the being of; obviously, neither the universal form o f nor the individual
form of can be identified with one of those three. Then we are left with the








Possibilities (ii) and (v) can be ruled out because the universal form of is not
identical with the actuating form o f These aspect functions are different be­
cause the universal form of human being x -  humanity -  is identical with the
universal form of human being xJ  -  humanity -  even if x and x7 are different;
but the actuating form of x -  the soul of x -  is different from the actuating
form of x7 -  the soul of x7 -  if x and x7 are different, as Thomas explicitly
states (see quotation 49).
And possibilities (iv) and (vi) can be ruled out because the universal form
of is not identical with the essence of. Thomas Aquinas says:
55. Dato enim quod esset aliquod corpus infinitum secundum magnitudinem.
utpote ignis vel aer. non tarnen esset infinitum secundum essenliam: quia
essentia sua esset terminata ad aliquam speciem per formant, et ad aliquod
Individuum per materiam (Summa theologiae, 1, 7, 3).
I take this quotation in its second part (after the colon) to make a statement
not only about material objects that have infinite magnitude, but about all
material objects. Consequently, the essence of a human being x is determined
(per materiam) to some individual (x itself); the universal form of x, however,
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is not thus determined, since it is common to several human beings. Thus, if
x7 is another human being, then the essence of x is different from the essence
of xr, but the universal form of x is nevertheless identical with the universal
form of x'. And therefore the essence o f and the universal form of are not
one and the same function. (From quotation 55, we may also conclude that
VxVx7(M(x) AM(x') A w(x) =  w(x') D x =  x7) -  Material objects are identical
if their essences are identical -  ought to be provable in TO**, either trivially,
as an axiom, or more or less nontrivially, as a theorem. Concerning this
matter, see section XX.)
We are now left with the possibilities (i) and (iii). Whichever of the two
we choose, the universal form o f turns out to be identical with the pure form
of. Therefore, if the universal form of and the individual fonn of are each as­
sumed to be identical with one of the fundamental aspect-functions treated in
this essay, then for every object x, the pure form of x turns out to be identical
with the universal form of x.
However, the basic supposition that led us to this result, the supposition
that the universal form of and the individual form o f are each identical with
one of the six fundamental aspect-functions, may seem to be insufficiently
supported by Thomasic evidence. Consider, therefore, also a different line of
argument for the conclusion that the function the pure form o f and the func­
tion the universal form o f are the same function. The word “forma” in its
occurrence in quotation 55 means pure fonn, since it is used to speak about
a constituent of essence. Thus, quotation 55 says, in its second part, that the
essence of a material object is determined by the object’s pure form to a cer­
tain species: the universal form of the object; but that it is not determined by
the object’s pure form (alone) to a certain individual: the object itself; rather,
this latter determination is effected by (with the help of) the matter of the
object. Therefore, the pure form cannot be the individual form of the object,
since the individual form of the object (as a constituent of essence) would
already by itself determine the essence of the object to a certain individual,
because the individual form cannot be common to several individuals. Hence
we may very plausibly assert that, according to Aquinas, the pure form of
a material object (i.e., the aspect that determines its species) is its universal
form (i.e., the aspect that is its species).
And this assertion about material objects can be generalized: the pure
form of any object is its universal form. This generalization is not supported
by any direct textual evidence (but there is also no textual evidence against it)
184 Uwe Meixner
but strongly recommends itself by its positive effect on the systematization
of other Thomasic doctrines, as we shall see. Given -  as Thomasic doctrine -
that the pure form of an object is its universal form, VxVx/ (f(x) =  f(x') D x =
x') cannot, after all, be regarded as a Thomasic individuation axiom or prin­
ciple, since, obviously, there are human beings who are different but whose
universal forms (species) are identical.
XIX
The following consideration shows (on the basis of Thomasic doctrine) that
the actuating form of and the individual form o f are not identical aspect­
functions. There are different objects that have the same actuating form (see
T50); but there are no different objects that have the same individual form:
different objects have different individual forms. Therefore, the only possi­
bility left -  under the assumption that allowed us to draw up the list (i) -  (vi)
in the previous section -  is item (iii), according to which the individual form
of is identical with the essence of. There is independent evidence for this:
(a) On the one hand, according to quotations 53 and 54. the individual
form of a material object is determined by the universal form and the matter
of the object. On the other hand, the essence of a material object is determined
(more precisely speaking: is composed) by the pure form and the matter of
the object (see quotation 1), that is, by the universal form and the matter of
the object. Hence it is plausible (although not inevitable) to conclude that the
individual form of a material object is its essence.
(b) According to quotation 55. the essence of a material object is deter­
mined to a certain species Cad aliquam specienf) and to a certain individual
Cad aliquod individuum'); but this is also true of the material object’s in­
dividual form: it is determined to a certain individual, and hence also to a
certain species. It is again plausible to conclude that the individual form of a
material object is its essence.
As in the case of the identity of pure form and universal form, so also
in the case of the identity of individual form and essence: the generalization
from material objects to all objects is not supported by any direct textual evi­
dence. Unless we count Summa theologiae, 1, 3,3, where Aquinas argues for
the identity of God and God’s essence and finally concludes in the Responsio:
56. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex materia et forma, ut ostensum est.
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oportet quod Deus sit sua deitas.
The reason given for the identity of God with God’s essence (i.e., for the
identity of God with God’s divinity) is insufficient (since there are objects
which are not [properly] composed of matter and pure form but which are,
nevertheless, not their essences). But this is not what is important here. What
is important here is that the identity of God with his divinity -  the identity of
God with his individual form -  is obviously meant to be the identity of God
with his essence. For Thomas, the individual form of God is the essence of
God.
In the Sed contra of the same article (Summa Theologiae, 1, 3, 3) it is
concluded, not that God is his divinity, but rather that God is divinity itself:
57. Deus est ipsa deitas.
From this we can infer that the identity of God and divinity itself -  the identity
of God and his universal form -  is meant to be the identity of God and his
essence (since the article in question is about the identity of God and his
essence). Hence not only the individual but also the universal form of God is
the essence of God. This is not surprising: in an immaterial object, essence
-  i.e., individual form -  and pure form -  i.e., universal form -  are identical
(see T3). The individual form of God is the universal form of God. and
consequently some individual form is a universal form, which means that
universal must not be equated with non-individual. (Not every universal form
is a non-individual form; nor is every non-individual form a universal form,
as will be seen in the last section of this essay.)
I append one more reason for the identity of essence and individual form
(according to Thomasic doctrine): The second argument in Summa theolo­
giae. 1, 3, 3, for the opposite of what Thomas seeks to establish, is as follows:
58. Praeterea, effectus assimilatur suae causae: quia omne agens agit sibi
simile. Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura: non
enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod sua
deitas.
In his refutation of this argument by analogy, Thomas denies that the similar­
ity it appeals to is sufficient for its conclusion. What he does not deny is that
a human being is not its (i.e., his or her) humanity, that is, its individual form,
and the non-identity of a human being and its individual form is clearly meant
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to be the non-identity of the human being and its essence. Thus, the essence
of a human being appears to be for Aquinas its individual form (sua human­
itas). In the same article, however, Aquinas also quite generally identifies
essence and pure form (=  universal form), as is mentioned in section VIII.
footnote 10. If we followed that identification, then the essence (natura) of
a human being (quo homo est homo) would not be sua humanitas, but would
be humanitas tout court, as Thomas explicitly says in the article. (See also
Summa contra gentiles, 1, 21.) Now. the essence of a human being cannot
be both its individual form and its universal form, because a human being is
a material object: consider quotations 53 and 54. which clearly imply that
individual and universal form are non-identical in a material object. In order
to avoid inconsistency, I ignore Thomas’s statements to the effect of a general
identification of pure form and essence (see footnote 10), which statements
also contradict what he says elsewhere (see quotation 5). (Perhaps there is no
real contradiction: Thomas may simply be using one word -  “essentia”, or
"natura” -  in two different senses: individual essence and universal essence.)
XX
The upshot of sections XVIII and XIX is that we can read f(t) both as ‘the
pure form of t’ and as ‘the universal form of t’, and that we can read w(t)
both as ‘the essence of t’ and as ‘the individual form of t*. We know, then,
quite well what the pure form and the essence of an object is, since the uni­
versal (substantial) form of an object is its kind or species, and the individual
(substantial) form the species of the object relative to the object (i.e., as par­
ticularized in the object).
The identity of essence and individual form leads to the acceptance of yet
another Thomasic individuation axiom:
15 VxVx7( w(x) =  w(x') D x -  x7 )
(Objects that have the same essence — the same individual form — are
identical)
Using 15 and T3, we obtain
T53 VxVxVM(x) A -nM(x/ ) A f(x) =  f(x') D x =  x/ )
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{Immaterial objects that have the same pure form are identical)
Proof : Assume ->M(x) A -^M ^) Af(x) =  f(V); hence by D3 and T3: w(x) =
f(x)A w (/) =  f(x'); hence w(x) =  w (/); hence by 15: x — x!.
According to T53, there are no two immaterial objects of the same species;
there are as many species of immaterial objects as there are immaterial ob­
jects. This agrees with Thomasic doctrine:
59. Secunda differentia [inter essentiam substantiae compositae et essentiam
substantiae simplicis] est quia essentiae rerum compositarum ex eo quod re-
cipiuntur in materia designata multiplicantur secundum divisionem eius, unde
contingit quod aliqua sint idem specie et diversa numéro. Sed cum essentia
simplicis non sit recepta in materia, non potest ibi esse tabs multiplicatio;
et ideo oportet ut non inveniantur in illis substantiis plura Individua eiusdem
speciei, sed quotquot sunt ibi individua. tot sunt species, ut Avicenna expresse
dicit {De ente et essentia, 4, 25).
In the Summa theologiae, however, Aquinas excludes human souls from the
general principle expressed by T53. According to him, there are many human
souls of the same species, albeit there are not many (in fact, not two) angels
of the same species:
60. licet anima intellectiva non habeat materiam ex qua sit, sicut nec angelus,
tarnen est forma materiae alicuius; quod angelo non convenit. Et ideo se­
cundum divisionem materiae sunt multae animae unius speciei: multi autem
angeli unius speciei omnino esse non possunt (Summa theologiae. 1, 76, 2).
What forces Aquinas to exclude human souls from the general principle that,
in immaterial objects, there are as many species as there are individuals is the
following opposing (Averroistic) argument:
61. [1] Nulla enim substantia immaterialis multiplicatur secundum numerum
in una specie. [2] Anima autem humana est substantia immaterialis [...] [3]
Non ergo sunt multae in una specie. [4] Sed omnes homines sunt unius
speciei. [5] Est ergo unus intellectus omnium hominum (Summa theologiae,
1. 76, 2).
Aquinas cannot accept [5]; his way out is to deny [3] (see quotation 60),
and therefore [1] (given [2]), thus contradicting T53 and what he says in one
place of De ente et essentia. In another place of De ente et essentia, however,
he states the same as in the Summa theologiae:
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62. Et ideo in talibus substantiis [substantiis creatis intellectualibus] non in-
venitur multitude individuorum in una specie, ut dictum est, nisi in anima
humana propter corpus cui unitur (De ente et essentia, 5. 31).
But to deny [3] in quotation 61 is certainly not the most reasonable way out
for Thomas Aquinas (who, of course, does not wish to accept Averroism: see
quotation 51). For how does [5] ‘There is one intellect of all human beings’
follow from the conjunction of [4] ‘All human beings are of the same species’
and [3] ‘Each human soul is the only one in its species’? Only by tacitly
supposing that ‘All human beings are of the same species’ validly entails ‘All
human souls are of the same species'37 -  and the validity of this entailment
is surely not beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, we are well-advised not to
accept its validity if we, unlike Thomas in some places of his works, accept
T53 just as it stands. For, if we accepted the validity of the entailment in
question, we could deduce, with the help of T53, the absurd conclusion that
there is at most one human being:
Suppose (for reductio) that x and xJ are two human beings; though they
are two, they are of the same species. Consider (making use of C2) the souls
x" and xJ" of these human beings: x" = a(x) and x"' = a(x7). Suppose (as is
tacitly supposed in the Averroistic argument of quotation 61) that if x and x7
are of the same species (which they are, like all human beings), x" and x"'
must be of the same species, too. Then, according to T53, it follows that x"
and x"1 are identical (since both x" and x"' are immaterial objects and f(x")
=  f(x"7)). Therefore: a(x) =  a(x7). and therefore because of 13 (since x and x7
are material objects): x =  x7 -  contradicting the initial assumption.
XXI
Essence, pure form and actuating form of an object are formal aspects of
it. Of the essence and pure form of an object, we now have a fairly pre­
cise understanding. Our understanding of its actuating form depends on the
understanding of its being. What is the being (or esse) of an object?
3 From ‘All human souls are of the same species' and ‘Each human soul is the only one in
its species’, it follows that there is at most one human soul, and hence that there is precisely
one human soul (since there is at least one human soul), and therefore, finally, that there is
precisely one human intellect (since there are as many human intellects as there are human
souls).
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It is another formal aspect of it. According to Aristotelian-Thomasic doc­
trine every universal form F (substantial or not) that applies to an object x  is
individualized in x: the F of x. Now, existence is a universal form that applies
to every object (recall that “object” was stipulated to mean as much as “ex­
isting object” in section III. footnote 2); hence existence is individualized in
every object x: the existence o f x. Like the whiteness of x  is that by which x,
if it is white, is white, so the existence of x is that by which x exists. But the
being (esse) o f x  is that by which x is:
63. Unumquodque est per suum esse (Su/nma contra gentiles, 1, 22).
Hence, accepting “x is” as a synonym of “x exists”, we may safely conclude:
the being of x is its existence.
Like the whiteness of x is different from the whiteness of x7 if x and x7 are
different white objects, so the existence of x is different from the existence
of x7 if x and x7 are different objects. Hence it is clear why 14 is a Thomasic
individuation axiom (the esse of any object being its existence).
14 and 15, in their intended interpretation, can be regarded as conse­
quences of a more general principle, which I state semiformally as follows:
IP If F is a universal form (substantial or not) that applies to object x and
F7 a universal form that applies to object x7 and the F o f x  (F relative to
x) is the F7 o f x! (F7 relative to x7), then x is identical to x7.
Given IP, 14 can be deduced as follows: Assume x is an object and x7 is an
object; hence existence is a universal form that applies to both. Assume the
being of x [s(x)] is the being of x7 [six7)]. Hence the existence of x is the
existence of x7, and hence by IP: x is identical to x7.
And 15 can be deduced as follows: Assume x is an object and x! is an
object. Assume the essence of x is the essence of x7; hence the individual
(substantial) form of x is the individual (substantial) form of x7. The species
of x, F, is a universal form that applies to x, and the species of x7, F7, is a
universal form that applies to x7. The individual form of x is F relative to x;
the individual form of x7 is F7 relative to x7. Hence F relative to x is F7 relative
to x7, and hence by IP: x is identical to x7.
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XXII
The actuating form of an object is determined by the pure form and the being
of the object, that is, by its species and its existence. In which manner? For
answering this question, it must first be noted that the sentence Hx3x7(a(x) =
a ( /)  A-T(x) =  f ( / )  A -’s(x) =  s(x')) becomes provable in TO** if we add as
an axiom the following sentence:
16 VxVx7(M(x) A -iM(x') D -f(x) =  f(x7))
(Material and immaterial objects do not have the same species')
Axiom 16 can easily be brought into the form of an individuation axiom,38
and Aquinas would certainly have accepted it. Before turning to the theorem
mentioned just before the introduction of 16, let it be noted that 16 allows us
to deduce “Immaterial objects are singular in their species’ (in other words,
‘There are no immaterial objects beside immaterial object x that are of the
species of x. and there are no material objects that are of the species of x’) to
be deduced from “Immaterial objects that are of the same species are identi­
cal’ (i.e., T53):
T54 Vx(->M(x) D Vx7(f(x7) =  f(x) D x7 =  x) )
Proof: Assume - ’M(x) and f(x') =  f(x); hence by 16: -'M(x'); hence by T53:
x7 =  x.
T55 3xHx7(a(x) =  a(x7) A -<f(x) =  f(x') A - ’s(x) =  s(x7))
Proof: By C3: 3xH(x); hence by C2: 3x(H(x) ABx 7(I(x 7) Ax7 =  a(x))). hence
by Cl and D6: 3x3x7(M(x) A -M (x ') Ax7 =  a(x)); hence by D3 and T l:
3x3x7(M(x) A-iM(x7) Ax7 =  a(x/ ) Ax7 =  a(x)); hence by 14 and 16: 3xBx7(a(x)
=  a(x7) A ->f(x) =  ^x 7) A - ’s(x) =  s(x7)).
T55 shows that the actuating form of an object is determined by the object’s
species and existence in a manner that is different from the manner in which
the individual form (or essence) of it is determined by its species and its
matter. In contrast to T55, we have because of 15:
3!The relevant form is VvVv'(B[0[v] =  D A[v. v']); see the beginning of section
XVII.
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T56 VxVx/ (w(x) =  w(x') D f(x) =  f(x') A m(x) =  m(x'))
However, the principle for the actuating form of an object that would be pre­
cisely analogous to T56 (but is falsified by T55) is preserved to a certain
extent, since its restrictions
T57 VxVx/ (M(x) AM(x') Aa(x) =  a(x') D f(x) =  ffx7) As(x) =  s(x'))
T58 VxVx7(- i M(x) A ->M(x/ ) A a(x) =  a(x') D f(x) =  f(x') A s(x) =  s(x'))
are theorems of TO** because of 13 and T52.
We do know a considerable amount about the behavior of the actuating
form of an object in relation to other object-aspects, but it is nevertheless
doubtful whether an object’s actuating form can in itself be satisfactorily
described in ontological terminology that is familiar and (relatively) clear to
us. We have seen that, according to Thomasic doctrine, the actuating form
of a human being is its (his or her) soul, and that the immaterial objects
are the subsistent actuating forms. But what has become clearer by this?
What is a human soul? What is an immaterial object? To the latter question
Aquinas would answer: God, or an angel, or a human soul. It seems we must
rest content with this. But of course we can add (with Aquinas): the non­
subsistent actuating forms -  the actuating forms that are not objects -  are the
souls of animals and plants, and the actuating forms of inanimate material
objects.
Vaguely, the actuating form of an object is that aspect of it that makes it
exist (that is, subsist) as an object of a certain species (regarding merely the
s(x) in a(x) -  i.e., in f(x) + s(x) -  and its role for the existence of the object,
see quotation 63). For example, the actuating form of this particular horse is
what makes it exist as a horse. And vivere est esse viventis (cf. quotation 39).
Hence the actuating form of this horse is what makes it live as a horse. But
what makes the horse live as a horse is also the horse’s soul; for the soul is
the principle of life:
64. anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt;
animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita carentes (Summa the-
ologiae, 1, 75, 1).
Thus, the actuating form of the horse is its soul. And thus, the line of Thoma­
sic thinking that leads to the identification of soul and actuating form in living
material objects is completely apparent.
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XXIII
The matter of an object is (leaving aside its empty aspect) the one non-formal
aspect of the object. There are two difficulties concerning that aspect:
The matter of an object is what it materially consists of. When? Living
material objects do not materially consist of the same at each instant of their
existence. Let x be a human being. Which instant of the existence of x shall
we select so that what x materially consists of at that instant is the matter of
x? This is the first difficulty.
The second difficulty is this: What does a material object (at a given time)
materially consist of? There are many levels of decomposition with respect
to which an answer can be given to this question. We may say that human
being x materially consists of this corpus potentia vitam habens', or of this
head and trunk, these arms and legs; or of this flesh and bones; or of these
cells; or of these protein-molecules; etc. etc. Which level of decomposition
shall we select so that what x materially consists of at that level is what x
materially consists of (at the given time)?
The second difficulty can be resolved as follows: The matter of x (at a
given time), what x materially consists of, is not the collection of the material
parts of x at a certain level of decomposition (in other words, is not what x
materially consists of at that level o f decomposition). It cannot be reached
at any level of decomposition: there is no level of decomposition such that
the matter of x is the collection of the material parts of x at that level of
decomposition. Rather, for every level of decomposition, the matter of x is
also the matter of the collection (or “sum") of the material parts of x at that
level of decomposition. Thus, the matter of x is a kind of abstract entity,
no less abstract, but in a different way, than the species of x. However, in
an analogical sense, the corpus potentia vitam habens of x can be called “the
matter of x” since this corpus is certainly the first (concrete) representative of
the matter ofx. Nota bene: Not the corpus potentia vitam habens of x, and not
the collections of material parts of x at any other (i.e.. higher than zero) level
of decomposition forx. are counted as material objects. Otherwise we would
have as many counterinstances to 12 as there are levels of decomposition for
(the human being) x.
Concerning the first of the above-described difficulties, relevant passages
can be found in the Summa contra gentiles, 4, 81. Thomas is confronted
with the problem of determining with which matter the soul is reunited at the
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resurrection to make up the resurrected human being. This problem arises
because at different times of life different matter was in the human being.
Thomas rejects the idea that the soul is reunited with the totality of matter
that was in the human being while alive; rather, the soul is reunited with
a sufficient part of this totality. Which part? Thomas suggests: that part
which was existing in a “more perfect” manner (“perfectius”) under the form
(species) of humanity:
65. non requiritur ad hoc quod resurgat homo numéro idem, quod quicquid
fuit materialiter in eo secundum totum tempus vitae suae resumatur: sed tan­
tum ex eo quantum sufficit ad complementum debitae quantitatis; et praecipue
illud resumendum videtur quod perfectius fuit sub forma et specie humanitatis
consistens (Sum m a contra gentiles, 4, 81).
Following Aquinas’s suggestion, I select an instant of time in the prime of
life of x and determine that the matter o f x is what x materially consists of at
that instant.
XXIV
A synopsis of Thomas Aquinas’s theory of forms concludes this essay. The
universal forms are the entities designated by abstract nominalizations (“beau­
tiful’ -  "beauty', ‘human’ -  "humanity', ‘just’ -  "justice', ‘woman’ -  "femi­
ninity', ‘exist’ -  "existence"). Some universal forms are substantial forms, but
most are not; universal substantial forms are (exemplified) species or natural
kinds (for example, humanity, divinity, caninity).
[I] Every object (i.e., substance or quasi-substance) has exactly one uni­
versal substantial form: its universal (substantial) form, or in other
words: its species, its pure (substantial) form.
A special universal form is existence. -  Every universal form is individuated
in the object which has it:
[II] There is at most one individuation of a universal form F in an object x.
[Ill] For all universal forms F and objects x: if x has F, then there is an
individuation of F in x: the individuation of F in x,  or in other words:
F relative to x, the F of x.
39
39The transition from ‘an’ to ‘the’ can be made in consideration of [II].
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And vice versa:
[IV] For all universal forms F and objects x: if there is an individuation of F
in x, then x has E
Furthermore:
[Va] For all f: f is an individual substantial form iff there is a universal sub­
stantial form F and an object x which are such that f is an individuation
of F in x.
[Vb] For all f: f is an individual form iff there is a universal form F and an
object x which are such that f is an individuation of F in x.
Every object has exactly one individual substantial form: its individual sub­
stantial form, in other words, its essence (the essences are the individual sub­
stantial forms):
[VI] For every object x: there is exactly one individual substantial form f
which is such that there is a universal substantial form F and f is an
individuation of F in x.
Proof : Let x be an object; the species of x is a universal substantial form
(according to [I]), and the species of x is had by x (according to [I]): hence by
[III]: there is an individuation of the species of x in x, hence by [II] (and the
logic of definite descriptions): the individuation o f the species of x in x is an
individuation of the species of x in x: hence by [Va]: the individuation of the
species of x in x is an individual substantial form, considering that there is a
universal substantial form F (namely, the species of x) and the individuation
of the species of x in x is an individuation of F in x. And there is no other
individual substantial form h which is such that there is a universal substantial
form F and h is an individuation of F in x. For let h be an individual substantial
form which is such that there is a universal substantial form F and h is an
individuation of F in x; hence by [IV]: x has F, and hence by [I]: F =  the
species of x; hence h is an individuation of the species of x in x; hence by
[II] (since x is an object and the species of x a universal form): h = the
individuation of the species o f x in x. This completes the proof.
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The above proof also shows that the essence of x is nothing other than the
individuation of the species of x in x. In material objects, the individuation of
the species of x in x is different from the species of x. In immaterial objects,
however, the individuation of the species of x in x is the species of x itself.
Hence, if there is an immaterial object (which Thomas does not doubt), then
some universal (and substantial) form, namely its species, is an individual
(and substantial) form.
Concerning individual existence, there are the following two theorems:
[VII] For every object x: the existence of x (s(x), the being of x) is an indi­
vidual form.
Proof -. Assume x is an object; existence is a universal form had by x (since,
in this essay, objects are understood to be existing objects); hence by [III]:
there is an individuation of existence in x; hence by [II]: the individuation
of existence in x is an individuation of existence in x; hence by [Vb]: the
individuation of existence in x -  in other words, the existence o f x -  is an
individual form.
[VIII] The existence of God is an individual substantial form.
Proof-. By T44: the existence of God is the essence of God [s(d) =  w(d)];
the essence of God -  like the essence of every other object -  is an individ­
ual substantial form (see above); hence the existence of God is not only an
individual form, but also an individual substantial form.
As can easily be seen (according to T44), there is no object other than God
whose existence is not only an individual form but also an individual sub­
stantial form.
It is entirely in the spirit of Aquinas to postulate principle IP in section
XXL
An actuating substantial form is the composite of the species of an object
-  a universal substantial form -  and the existence of that object -  an indi­
vidual form. Every object has exactly one actuating substantial form, since
there is exactly one actuating substantial form which is the composite of its
species and its existence. The immaterial objects are the subsisting actuating
substantial forms. But no individual or universal form subsists -  with one
exception: divinity (=  the species of God — the individuation of the species
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of God in God =  the divinity of God (f(d) =  w(d)J =  the existence of God
(w(d) =  s(d)] =  God |s(d) =  d]), which is both a subsisting universal form
and a subsisting individual form. Since no individual or universal form, ex­
cept divinity, subsists, every subsisting actuating substantial form that is not
divinity (=  the actuating substantial form of God. since f(d) =  a(d)) is neither
a universal nor an individual form. (A subsisting actuating substantial form
-  different from divinity -  is not an individual form in the sense defined by
[Vb], although, of course, it is an individual which is also a form.) Hence
there are non-individual forms that are not universal forms (if there are cre­
ated immaterial objects), in other words: not every non-individual form is a
universal form.
Divinity, and no other entity, is at once a subsisting entity and a form that
is universal, individual, and actuating; it is, we may say, a form in the original
Platonic sense. As far as God and divinity is concerned. Thomas Aquinas
adheres to Platonism. (It is a distortion to see him as a pure Aristotelian.)
As the Beautiful in itself, subsistent Beauty, is the object of intense emotion
for Plato (as is seen in the climax of Socrates’s report of Diotima's speech in
the Symposium), so subsistent Divinity -  God -  is for Thomas the object of
intense emotion: A.doro te devote, latens Deitas ...40
Sources of the quotations:
Summa theologiae, Milan: Edizioni Paoline 1988.
Summa contra gentiles, vol. 1 (liber 1), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch­
gesellschaft 1974; vol. 2 (liber 2), Darmstadt: WBG 1982; vol. 4 (liber 4),
Darmstadt: WBG 1996.
4,1The evidence this hymn provides for the Platonism in Thomas’s Christian devotion is
slightly less perfect than the quoted words suggest. For, originally (as formulated by Thomas
himself), the first line of the hymn read "Te devote laudo. latens veritas”. See Robert Wie-
lockx, "Adorn te devote. Zur Lösung einer alten Crux”, Annales Theologici 21 (2007), pp.
101-138, and see ibid, especially pp. 136-138. Of course, subsistent Truth had been offi­
cially identified with God ever since the time of St. Augustine. Thus, subsistent Truth was
to Thomas’s mind nothing else than subsistent Divinity. But note the difference: subsistent
Divinity is identical to divinity, but subsistent Truth is not identical to truth (and subsistent
Existence -  God again -  is not identical to existence).
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